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ABSTRACT 
Th is Safety Evaluation Report for the application filed by the University of 
Utah ( UU) for a renewal of operati ng license R-126 to continue to operate a 
t r aining cod research reac tor facility has been prepared by the Office of 
Nucl ear Reac tor Regulatio n of the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission . The 
facil i ty is c~ned and operated by the University of Utah and is located on i ts 
campu s in Sa 1 t Lake City, Sa 1 t Lake County, Utah . The staff conc 1 udes that 
th i s t ,-a i ni ng reactor f ac i 1 i t y can cont i nue to be operated by UU wi thout 
endange r ing the health and safety of the public . 
iii 
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I NTRODUCTJ ON 
The Un i vers i ty of Utah (UU/licensee) submitted a tinle ly application for a 20-year 
renewal of the Class 104 operating l i cense (R-126) (NRC Docket No . 50-407) for 
i ts TRIGA research reactor facility to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
( NRC/ s t aff) by letter (with supporting documentation) dated March 8 , 1983 . The 
app li cat ion was signed by the Vice President of Research of the University of 
Utah and notar i zed. The UU reactor facility currently is permitted to ope rate 
wi t hi n the conditions authorized in past license amendments in accordance wi th 
Ti t l e 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Paragraph 2. 109 , unt il NRC 
ac tion on t he renewal"request IS completed . 
The staf f technica l safety review, wi th respect to issuing a renewa l operat i ng 
li cense to the UU facility, has been based on the information ccnta i ned i n the 
r enewa 1 app 1 i cat i on and support i ng supp 1 ements, pl us responses to reques ts fo r 
addit iona l i nfo rmation . The renewal appl ication i nc l udes Financ ial Informat ion , 
an Environmenta l Report , Techn ical Specif ications , Reactor Operato r Requa li fi-
cation Progr am , and an Emergency Plan . This mater ial i s ava il able for r evi ew 
at the Comm i ssi on' s Pub l ic Document Room at 1717 H Street N. W. , Wash i ngto n, D. C. 
The previously approved Physical Security Pl an i s protected f rom pub l ic di scl o-
sure under 10 CFR 2. 790(d)(I ) and 10 CFR 9.5(a)(4) . 
The purpose of t his Safety Eva l uation Report (SER) i s to summar i ze the results 
of t he safety r eview of the UU TRIGA reacto r (UUTR) and to de l ineate the scope 
of the t echnica l deta il s cons idered i n eva l uat iolg the radiological safety aspects 
of cont i nued operat ion. Th is SER will serve as the basis for renewal of the li-
cense for operation of the UU facili ty at thermal power leve l s up to and includ-
ing 100 kW. The fac i li ty was rev iewed aga i ns t the r equirements of 10 CFR 20, 30, 
50, 51, 55, 70, and 73; appli cable regulatory gui des ( Di vi s ion 2 , Research and 
Test Reac to rs) ; and appropr iate accepted i ndust ry standa rds [Amer ican National 
Standa rds Ins titute/ Ame rican Nuc l ea r Soc i ety (ANSI / ANS 15 ser i es» ). Because 
t he re are no spec if i c acc i dent- re 1 ated regu 1 at i ons for resea rch reactors, the 
staff has compared ca lcul ated dose va lues wi th r e l at ed standa rds in 10 CFR 20, 
the standa rds for pro tect ion aga i ns t radi at ion , bo th for emp loyees and the 
publ ic . 
This SER wa s prepared by Robert E. Carter, Projec t Manage r , Division of Licens-
ing, Off ice of Nucl ear Regu lato ry Regul a ti on , U.S . Nucl ear Regu lato ry Comm issi on . 
Major contributor s to the t echnica l review incl ude t he Pro j ect Manager and 
J . E. Hyder, K. K. S. Pil lay, and A, E. Sanchez- Pope of Los Alamos National 
Laboratory (LAN L) under contract to the NRC . 
1.1 Summary and Concl us i ons of Princ i pal Safety Consi de rat ions 
The staf f ' s eva luat ion considered the i nformat ion submitted by the licensee , 
pas t operat i ng hi s tory recorded i n annua 1 repor ts s ubm i t ted to t he Commi ss ion 
by the licensee , and reports by t he NRC Reg ion IV Off i ce . In add ition , as par t 
of i ts licens ing revi ew of severa l TRIGA reactors , the s taf f ob t ained laboratory 
studies and ana lyses of severa l acc idents pos t ul at ed for t he TRI GA reactor . 
The sta f f ' s conc lusi ons , based on evaluat ion and resol ut ion of t he principal 
is sues revi ewed for the UUT R, are as fol lows : 
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(1) The des ign and pe rfo rmance of . the reactor st r u~ture and sys tems and compo-
nents Important t o sa fety dUri ng normal operatIon are inhere ntl y sa fe, and 
safe ope ratI on can reasonabl y be expected t o continue. 
(2 ) The expect ed consequences of a broad spectrum of pos t ul a t ed credib le acc i-
dent s have been conSIdered, emphas izing those that could lead t o a loss 
of Integrity of fue l e lement c ladding . The staff performed conservat ive 
anal yse s of the mo s t seri ous credible accidents and dete rmi ned that the 
ca l culated potent ia l radiation doses outs ide the r eact or r oom would no t 
exceed 10 CFR 20 gU Idance for un restricted area s. 
( 3) The . l i censee ' s management organi zati on, conduc t of t ra i ning and res earch 
ac tI VItIes: ~nd securi ty meas ures are adequate to ensure safe opera t ion 
of the faClllty and pro t ec t ion of its spec i al nuc lear ma t_e ria l. 
( 4) The systems prov ided for the con t ro l of r adiolog ical effluent s can be 
ope ra tedto ensu:e t hat relea ses ? f radi oac t ive was tes from the fac i l i ty 
are WIth,n the l,m,ts of the CommIssIon 's regu lati ons and at'e as low as 
IS reasonably ac hIevable (ALARA). 
(5) The licensee' s Techn ical Spec if icati ons . wh ich pI'ovi de lim i t s controlling 
operat Ion of the fa cil i ty, are such t hat there is a high degree of assur-
ance that t he facili ty wil l be operated safely and rel iab ly. 
(6) The fina nc ia l data provided by the l icensee are such t ha t thp staff h"s 
determ ined t hat the 1 icensee ha s suf fi ci ent revenues t o cover opel'at ing 
cos t s and eventuall y t o decommi ssion the reactor facili ty. 
(7) The . l icensee' s pro gra~ for provi d ing for th~ physical protection of t he 
faCI l I ty and ItS speCIal nuclear material comp l ies with the requirements 
of 10 eF R 73. 
(8) The 1 i censee' s procedures for traini ng reac t or operators and t he plan for 
operator r equal ,fICat , on are acceptabl e . Thes e pI'oc edlll'eS give rea sonab le 
assura nce tha t t he reac t or faClI I ty WIll be operated wi th competence. 
(9) The licensee has submitted an Emergency Plan h3t is in compliance witn 
the eXIs tI ng applICable regUlations. This item is discus sed further in 
Secti on 13 . 3. of this report . 
1.2 Reactor Descrip t ion 
The UUTR i s a hete rogeneou~, open tank- type TR IGA reac t o r . The co re is coo I ed 
by natural convectIon of l,ght water , moderated by z;"conium IIydrtde and lIght 
water : and reflec t edby a combination of light watel', hea vy 101 ter (0 .0) , and 
graphI t e . The core IS located near the bottom of an 8-ft-tliameter' ai umin um 
t an k that is coaxial w!th a 12-ft-diameter s t eel shel l, all of wh ich res 
on a concrete pad and IS surrounded by ea r th below qround leve l The space 
between tanks is filled with tamped sand. 
The reactor core consists of a mixture of stainless-steel-clad anti alumin um-
clad uran i um zirconium hydride (U-IrH
x
) fuel elements that are as~embled In 
concentr ic hexagonal rings and suppor ed by a 1.9- cm-th ick aluminum grid plate . 
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The reactor is I icensed to operate at thermal power levels UP t o and i nc l uding 
100 kW , using uranium fue; enr iched to less than 20% in the ~3SU iso tope . 
1. 3 Reactor Location 
The reactor is located on the ground floor i n the Me rrill Engineering Bu ildi ng 
on the campus of the University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County , 
Utah. 
1.4 Shared Facilities and Equipment 
The reactor faci li ty shares its utiiities--electricity, water , natural gas, 
sanitary sewage, and the like- -with the remainder of the engineering building . 
The reactor room has a dedicated air exhaust system , but i t s heating and a i r-
condit ioning system is integral with the rest of t he buildin~. 
1.5 Reactor History 
Some of the components of this reactor, such as control rods, control console, 
and most of the fue l elements were operated i n a licensed reactor at the University 
of Arizona from 1958 to 1971. In 1971 these component s were transferred to the 
University of Utah where they were ins talled in their current location. The 
UU facility was licensed by NRC in September of 1975 to operate the reactor at 
the same power I eve 1 as i t had been l icensed for a t the Uni vers i ty 0 f Ar i zona . 
The reactor has been ut iii zed by the Nuc I ear Engi neeri ng Program of the Department 
of Mec hanical Engineering since 1975. 
1.6 Comparison With Similar Facilities 
The reactor fuel elements are simi lar to those in most of the 58 TRIGA-type 
reacto.s in operation throughout the world , 27 of which are in the United States , 
and 24 of these are I i censed by the NRC . The instruments and controls are typical 
of the origina l TRIGA reactors and similar in principle to both the more recent 
TRIGA reactors and most of the other nonpower reactors I icensed by NRC. 
1. 7 Nuc lear Waste Po l icy Act of 1982 
Sect i on 302(b ) (I)(B) of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 provides that the 
NRC may require, as a precondit ion to issuing or renewing an operating license 
f o r a re searc h or tes reactor , that the applicant shall have entered in to an 
agreement wi th t he Department of Energy (ODE) for the disposal of hi gh-level 
rad ioact ive wastes and spent nuc lear fuel. DOE (R . l. Morgan ) has informed 
he NRC (H. Denton) by letter dated May 3, 1983, that it has determined that 
uni vers i t i es and other government agenc i es operat i ng nonpower reactors have 
en ered i nto contrac t s ." i th DOE that provi de that DOE retain title to the fuel 
and i s ob li gated to t ake the spent fuel and/ or high-level waste for storage or 
r eprocessing . Because the Un iversity of Utah has entered into such a contract 
."i t h DOE he app I i cab I e requ i rements a f the Wa s te Po I icy Ac t of 1982 have been 
sa is f i ed for he UUT R 
Un i vers i ty 0 f Utah SER 1- 3 
~tSi COPY A'lAI LAaLE 
SITE CHARACTERISTICS 
2.1 Geography 
The campus of the University of Uta h is located ea st of the downtown center 
of Salt Lake City at an altitude well above it on the foothills of the Wasatch 
mountain range . Sa lt Lake Ci ty, along with other nearby towns and communities, 
IS located near the cen t er of a 2000 km' area known as th~ Great Salt Lake 
Valley that is bounded on the north and ea s t by the Wasatch Mountains and on 
the wes t by the Oqui rrh Mounta i ns. 
The Merrill Engineering Building, which houses the reactor facil i ty , is located 
on rela tively high ground near the north boundary of the campus The location 
of the campus, in relation to the city , major highways, and the pri ncipal 
municipal airport , is shown in Figure 2. 1. 
2. 2 Demography 
The pop Ulation of Salt Lake City itse l f has remained relat i vel y constant i n 
recent years, but the increa se in towns and cit ie s in the valley has been large . 
The area surrounding the Merrill Engineering Build i ng is l ight ly populated, 
WI th some permanent res idences about 300 m to the wes t and about 600 m to the 
north . No res i dences lie eas t 0 f the bu i I di ng because the campu s ex te nd s in 
this direction up the slopes of the Wasatch Mountains. The ma in complex of 
university bui l dings on campus lies generally to the sou th of the reactor s ite , 
so that the nearest off-campus residence in that direction i s about 1.6 km 
away . That residence is on a U.S. Government installation that extends for 
about O.B km before the nearest civil ian residence i s reached. 
2.3 Nearby Transportation , Industrial, and Military FKilities 
2.3.1 Transpor tati on Rou tes 
The university campu s is near the edge of the main residential section of the 
valley, and at leas t 5 km from the nearest heavily-traveled interestate highway . 
The principal a irport in Salt Lake City is at least 10 km away, and no major 
air route s c ross the campus . 
2.3.2 Nearby Facilities 
There are no nearby industrial facilities that con t ri bute to heavy local trucking 
or commuting t r aff ic . Fort Douglas, the mi li tary ins ta ll at ion so uth and east 
of the campus, does not have a large contingent of personnel and con tributes no 
significant traff ic or congestion within about 1.6 km of the reactor site . 
2.3.3 Conclusion 
Because there are no major transportat ior. routes, and no sign if i cant i ndustri a I 
or m.litary facilities in the near vic i nity of the reac t or site that could 
cause acc i denta 1 damage to the reac tor, the s ta ff conc I udes tha t such acc i dents 
need not be hypothesized or evaluated . 
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2 4 Me eorology 
,al t Lake City has a semiarid. con t i ne ntal climate with four weI' uef i ned 
s~a sons. Summers are characterized by hot. d,-y weather . and winLer s are cold. 
but no t severe. Mountains to t he north and ea s t act as a bar ri e r t o in vasions 
of col d continental air. and the moun tains t o the west s helter the vall ey t o 
some extent from s torms associated with southwesterly winds . The G"eat Sa lt 
Lake is he most in fluential natural feature affecting the gene,'al c l i mate of 
Sal Lake Ci t y. Because of i ts high salt content. the lake never freezes and 
tend s t o moderate the otherwise colder weather i n winter . 
Throughou t t he year. the lake. th e valley . and the h igh Wa satch flou ntains 
sus ta in a pre vailing wi nd pattern at the reac t or s ite unle ss there is a ma s sive 
s t orm s tructure predominating . During hours o f dayligh t , ai,' moves gene"ally 
up t he slopes from the lake to the moun ta ins . and after da"k the air mo ves 
gene ' d 'ly down the slopes from the mou ntains . This pa ttern mean s that there 
are em~orary ir. versions tw ice a day while the change in direc ti on is occurring 
ar ,~ t~at '- he pre va iling wind direction du ring the daytime when the '·eacto,· 
would be operated is up-mountain. away from the city and mo s t of the suburban 
popu 1 a t i on concent rat ions . 
The severest weather condi ti ons likely at the reactor site are t hunderstorms 
deve loping over the higher mountaios . Tornados and t" opica l disturbances do 
not propaga t e in to the Wasatch foot >i lls . 
On the basis of the meteorological data presented i n the licensee's Sa ety 
Analysis Report (SAR ) . the staff co"cludes that the meteorological cond i tions 
at the reac t or site do not pose a significant risk of damage to the reacto r nor 
rencer the si t e ot herwise unaccep tal' le for the facility. 
2 . 5 Geology 
The reactor site is located in the nor theastern part of the Salt La ke Valley . 
a 1 so known as the Jordan Va 11 ey, wh i ch is surrounded on three sides by mounta i ns 
and ope ns t oward the nor t hwest into the Great Sa lt Lake basin . The Oqui"rh 
Ra nge . with an average height o f 2590 m above mean sea level (fISL) and peaks to 
2960 m above MSL. makes up the western boundary of the valley . The southern 
boundary consists of the low east-west trave rse range, containing a water gap 
through which the Jordan River flows to the nor th . The eastern boundary of the 
valley is formed by the Wa satch Range , with higher summit s nea" 3660 m above 
flSl. The Salt Lake salient, an elongate bedroc k spur , extends we s twa rd ("-6 km) 
from the main Wasatch Range jus t north of the site. Two main canyons break the 
Wasatch Range in t his area . In addition , many smaller canyons ope n in to the 
valley fro m all ranges . The valley floor consists of a broad. flat cen t"a l 
plain at an elevation of - 12BB m above HSl. A system of na'TOW Lacllstrine 
t erraces, derived fro m sedi ment s deposited in prehi s t oric Lake Bonneville. ring 
the basin at the base of the bordering mountains. The sediments of the valley 
floor and the surroundi ng terraces we re deposited during Lake Bonnevi lIe time 
(la te Pleistocene , "- I Hillion t o 10 thousand years before present) . 
Utah is divided into three physiographic provinces : (1 ) the bloc~ ault ed Basin 
and Range; (2) the re la tivel y stable Colorado Pla t eau. includ ing the high pla teaus 
of Utah and part of the Canyonlands; and (3) the middle Rocky lounta ins Geo-
logic and geophysica' s tudies i nd icate that the h igh pIa eaus of Utah cons titute 
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a transit ion zone that contains geologic structures common to both the Basin 
and Range and the Colo rado Plateau provinces, but that the deep crust and upper 
mantle beneath t he high plateaus apparently re semble more closely those of the 
Basin and Range province. An in tense zone of seismicity along this belt in 
Utah is cons i de red to be ev i dence a f an ac ti ve tec ton i c zone along the boundary 
between two distinctly different crustal masses. 
Soil strata in the vicinity of the reactor site is dry and compact . The upper 
so ils are predominantly granular, with silty sand (fine) ranging to a clayey 
s i lt binder . Coarser particles range from sand s izes to gravel, cobbles, and 
boulders . Borings and penetration tests encountered no free ground water with in 
12 m of the s ur face of the undisturbed soil. 
The nearest brown fault to the reac t or site (see Figure 2 . 2) is the East Bench 
Fault, a branch of the seismically active Wasatch fault, that lies about 600 m 
to the west. Two high angle faults, wh ich may also be branches or segment s of 
the Wasatch fault, the Warm Springs and Virginia Strut faults, have been exposed 
by excavat ions on the wes tern and southe rn margins of t he Salt Lake salient, 
respective ly. The Warm Spr i ngs fault is a ma j or normal fault that abruptl y 
term inate s the sali ent on the west (T . L. Pavlis and R. B. Smi th , 1980) . The 
fault can be traced as a bedrock escarpment from downtown Salt Lake City north-
ward a t least 8 km . Steep gravity con tour s continue 13 km nort hward fro m the 
l ast mapped locat ion o f the fau lt , sugges t ing a northwa rd cont inuation to near 
Centervil l e, Utah. The Virginia Street fault shows no clear-cut displacement 
of Quaternary depos i ts , but e vi dence of recent mov eme nt has been suggested by 
R. B. Kal iser (1976 ). Because the Wasatch fault is a fa ult zone with possible 
unrecogn ized fau l t branches and segments, the reactor s hould be considered to 
li e within a zone of faul t ing . Additionally, on the basis of exi s ting infor-
mation, ground su rface rupture in the vicin i ty of the reactor cannot be 
exc I uded. 
The Wasatc h fau l t is an act ive in traplate fault that defines part of the 
boundary between the Rocky Mountains and the Basin and Range provinces . It 
trends north-south, is a westerly d ipp i ng normal fault , extending for more than 
370 km from Gunniso n , Utah, t o Ma lad City, Idaho . The fault exhibits almost 
continuous geomorphic expression of La te Quaternary faulting (less than approx-
imately 1 mi llion years before present) , displac i ng Late Pleistocene lacustri ne 
sediments, glacial moraines , and Holocene (less than 10 thousa nd years before 
present) a lluvi a l and coll uvia l deposits. Glacial and geomorphic evidence clearly 
indicates that large earthquakes have occurred repeatedl y along the fault 
throughout he La te PIe i s t ocene and Ho I ocene time, a I though in northern Utah 
the fault has not been associated with earthquakes greater tha n estimated 
Rich ter magn i tude 5 112 since 1850 (W . J. Arabasz et aI., 1980). 
2.6 Se ismology 
Salt Lake City I ies along the Intermountain Se ismic Belt separat ing the Basin 
and Range and the Colorado Plateau provinces . In the Salt Lake City area, seis -
mici ty centers on he Wasatch fault zone (Arabasz et aI., 1980). Since earth-
quake records fo r Utah began in 1850, the largest events associated wi th t he 
Wasatch fau lt zone in nor hern Utah were the in tens ity VII (estimated Richter 
agn i tude 5 1/ 2) events in Salt Lake City in 1910 and in Ogden in 1914 . In 
sou he r n U ah he most severe earthquake associated with the Wa satch fault zone 
was the intensity VIII event on Novembe r 13, 190 1 in Richfield (about 240 km 
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south of Sa lt Lake Ci ty). The neares t known f au 1 t to the rea~tor site is the 
East Bench fault, a branch of the Wa satch fault, which 1 ies about 600 m west of 
the reactor site . The largest event as soci ated with this fault was magnitude 4.9. 
2.7 Hydrology 
The Merr ill Engineering Buil ding is located on hi gh gro und on the campus, with 
the ground sloping down to the west with about a 10% grade . Orainage and ground 
water character i s t ics at the reactor site are acceptab 1 e and pose no sign if i cant 
threat of flooding or water damage . 
No ground wate r was r evea l ed during excavation for bu ilding cons truct i on , so 
soils s urrounding the outer tank will r emain fixed. Therefore , any radioacti-
vity induc ed in these soils by neutron irradiation wi ll be i mmobile and will 
not enter ground water that may l i e deeper below the building . Furthermore, 
the shielding around t he reactor core reduces neutron fluxes in the amb i ent 
soi Is to acceptab l e levels. 
2.8 Conclusion 
On the bas i s of the above cons i derat ions, the staff cone 1 udes that the natura 1 
features and characteristics of the reactor site make i t suitable for the loca-
t i on of the reactor . 
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3 DE SIGN OF ST RUCTURES , SYSTEMS , AND COMPONENTS 
The licensee's Final Safety Analysis Report provides information on the design 
and functions of the reactor building and the reactor systems and auxi l i ary 
sys tems. 
3.1 Wind Damage 
The foothill region of the Wasatch Mountains where the reactor is located exper-
i ences very few extreme wi nd condi t ions such as tornadoes or in 1 and hurri canes . 
The reactor is located at the ground level of the Merrill Engineering Bui lding 
that was designed and constructed to withstand strong winds associated with 
local natural phenomena such as thunde rs torms . On the bas is of the above in-
format i on, the staff concludes that significant wi nd and storm damage to the 
UUTR i s ve ry unlikely . 
3.2 Water Damage 
As i ndicated in Section 2, the reactor building is situated on locally high 
ground on the gently slopi ng and undulating foothills of the Wasatch Mountains . 
Therefore, the staff concludes that the re is reasonable assurance that signifi-
cant damage to the reactor because of flooding is not 1 ikely eno ugh to render 
the s ite unsuitable as the location of the reactor . 
3. 3 Sei smi c - Induced Reacto r Damage 
Historical informat ion on past seismic act ivi ty and the likelihood of future 
earthquakes in the Salt Lake City area i ndicate that the reactor is located in 
a general region in whi ch the probability of earthquakes is high . However , the 
reactor core is contained in a tank system consisting of coaxial tanks resting 
on a 1 arge concrete pad, a 11 surrounded by compacted soi 1. In the event of an 
earthquake with likely effects at the reactor site, th is reactor structure is 
designed to s hift, as necessary, to relieve stresses without rupture . 
Moreover, as discussed in Section 14 of th is SER, even catastrophic damage 
that would cause total loss of moderator water or mechanical damage to fue l 
cladding would not lead to unacceptabl e radiation exposures in the unrestricted 
environment . On the basis of these consi derat ions, the staff concludes t hat 
the risk of radiological hazard resulting f r om seismic damage to the reactor 
facil ity is not signi f icant. 
3.4 Mechanical Systems and Component s 
The mechanical systems importan t to safety are the neutron-absorbing cont rol 
rods sus pended from the reac tor superstructure. The motors, gear boxes, 
switches, and wi ring are all above the level of the water and readily acces-
s ible for visual inspection, testing, and maintenance . An effecti ve preventive 
maintenance program has been in effect for many yea rs at the UUTR to ensure 
that operabi 1 ity of the reactor systems remains in conformance wi th the per-
formance requirements of the TeChnical Specifica t ions, and corrective mainten-
ance is accomp I i shed as needed . 
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3. 5 Conclusion 
The UUT R was des i gned and bu i 1 t to wi ths tand all credi b 1 e and probab 1 e wi nd and 
water events associated with the site . The consequences of a seismic event 
would not pose a significant radiological hazard to the public (see Section 14). 
There is no evidence of significant deterioration of systems or components . 
Therefore, the staff has concluded that the construction of the facility is 
acceptable and that continued operation, as proposed, will not cause signifi-
cant radiological risk to the public . 
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4 RE AC TOR 
The University of Utah reactor is a General Atomic TRIGA Mark I reactor that 
operates at a maxi mum power level of 100 kW. It uses solid uranium-zirccnium-
hydride fuel containing 8 and/ or 8 . 5 wt % uranium enriched to <20% 2 3 Sl'. The 
UUTR contains a mi xed core of stainless-steel-clad and aluminum- clad e lements. 
The reactor core is immersed i n an open tank of light water that serves as the 
neutron moderator, coolant, and partial shield. The reactor powe r is regulated 
by inserting or wi thdrawi ng neutron-absorbi ng control rods. Many TRIGA reactors 
are designed and instrumented to operate in the pulse mode; however , the UUTR 
has no pulsing capabilities. 
The UUTR initially attained criticality in October 1975 . It is used as a neu-
tron source fo r activation analysis studies, academic research, and the limited 
product i on of radioactive isotopes. It also is used as a training facility for 
the engineering educational program. Currently it is operated for an average 
of 10 MWh/ yr . The pri ncipal design parameters for the current core configura-
tion are listed in Table 4.1. 
The UUTR facil i ty layout in the Merrill Engineering Building is shown in 
Figure 4 . l. 
An Aerojet General-Nuclear (AGN-201M) 5-W nuclear reactor, also licensed by 
NRC, is used for teaching and training purposes and is located in the reactor 
room. However, no neutronic interaction or hazard coupling between the TRIGA 
and the AGN- 201M is considered credible. 
4 . 1 Reactor Core 
The reactor core is a hexagonal configuration of cylindrical, mixed stainless-
steel-clad and aluminum-clad fuel-moderator elements and heavy water (DzO)-filled 
reflector elements surrounded by trapezoidal DzO-fi lied reflector tanks . Graphite 
sections, 4 in . (10.2-cm) long, in the top and bottom ends of the fuel elements 
serve as axial neutron reflectors for the core . 
Figure 4 . 2 shows a cross-sectional view of the reactor tank . The reactor 
core assembly forms a l.l-m diameter by 0. 58-m-deep r i ght hexagon . The fuel 
elements and 3 control rods are pos it i oned by the upper and lower a 1 umi num 
grid plates. 
4 . 1. 1 Fuel Elements 
The UUTR uses cylindrical alumi~um-clad and stainless-steel- c lad fuel-moderator 
elements in which the fuel is a solid homogeneous mi xture of uranium-zirconium-
hydride alloy containin~ uranium enriched to slightly less than 20% 23 SU . The 
nominal weight of the 2 Su in each of the aluminum-clad fuel elements is 37 g, 
and the weight in each of the stainless-steel-clad fuel elements is 39 g . Cur-
rently, there are 18 aluminum-clad fuel elements and 70 stainless-steel-clad 
fuel elements loaded in the UUTR core . The core posit i ons of the aluminum-clad 
and sta inless-s teel-clad elements are shown in Figure 4 .3 . The nominal hydrogen-
to-zi rco nium ratio of the moderator material incorporated into the fuel is 0.9:1 
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Table 4. 1 Principal design parameters 
Para eter Description 
Reactor type TRIGA Mark I 
ax i um licensed power level 100 kW thermal 
Fuel element des i gn 
Fuel-moderator material-
Uranium inventory 
(current core configuration) 
Uran ium content 
Uran ium enr ichment 
5hape 
Length of fue l 
Diameter of fuel 
Cladding mater ial and nom i nal 
thickness 
Weight 23sU/ fue l element 
Number of fuel elements 
Reactiv ity worths 
Excess reactivity 
Safety rod (1) 
Shi. rod (1) 
Regu lating rod (1) 
otal react ivi ty of rods 
Reactor coo ling 
Reflector 
U-ZrH1. 6 and U-ZrH1. 0 
3. 35 kg 23SU 
8 and 8. 5 wt % (aluminum and 
stainless-steel (55) clad, 
respectively) 
<20% 23SU 
Cylindrical 
14 in. (35 . 6 cm) Al clad elements 
IS in. (38.1 cm) 55 clad elements 
1.47 in. (3.7 cm) 
304 stainless steel [0 . 02 in. (O.OS cm) 
thick] or alu.inum [0.03 in . (0 . 076 cm) 
thick] 
~37 g (8 wt % Al clad fuel) and ~39 g 
(8 . S wt % 55 clad fuel) 
72 (minimum core) or 88 (current core) 
0.83% Ak/k (1 . 18S) (current core); 
1. 96% Ak/k (2 .80S) (Tech . 5pec . maximum 
limit) 
1.24% Ak/k (1 . 76S) 
1. 08% Ak/k (1.55$) 
0. 32% Ak/k (O.46S) 
2.64% Akik (3.77S) 
Natural convection of pool water 
Water, 0zO-filled trapezoidal tanks, 
and cylindrical D20-filled elements 
0. 7% Ak/k 
eel-clad e lements, the nominal H/Zr ratio is 1. 60 and the 
1. 67 . For luminum-clad elements, the nominal ratio is 0. 9 
I ue is 1. O. 
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or the aluminum-clad elements and 1.6: 1 for the stainless-steel-clad elemen t s. 
The uel sec ion of each cylindrical element is 35.6 cm long and 38.1 em Ion 
respec ively , and 3.7 cm in diameter. Graphite end plugs 10 .2 cm long 00 h 
ends 0 he uel element serve as axial neutron reflectors. The uel d and 
rap e sec ions 0 he uel elements are con ained in 0.05-cm- hic st inless-
s ee l - ubes or 0.076-cm- hick aluminum-walled tubes, respectively. Ap-
propri i ~in s re elded to he ends 0 the cladding. A schema ic 
o t RI A lu inurn- cl ad uel elemen is shown in Figu 
. 2 Con 01 Rod 
ee 
uu 
ru s 
o con ro l nd regulate he po er I v Is in the 
i ng 'od, nd a sa e y od . Each 0 he hr ee r'ods 
ed alu inu gui e ube . The neutron absorber can-
is bo on ca bide in sea led aluminum ube. Each 
nd has vertical tra el a 3 cm . Th re til l ing 
ia ete r, and e shim and safety ~ods ha e 2.22 cm 
a mum ate 0 i hdra al a the shim nd sa e ods 
inu e and -0.30$ pe minute for the regul t ing rod. 
so bin sec ions 0 he control rods are supported b leet'o-
a e suspended by s eel cables t a e rolled on a motor-dr iven 
elev t ion in he core region. 
.1.3 on ource 
he UU R uses a 5-Ci Pu-Be neu tron source or reactor startup. The sourc is 
located in special re lector element source holder in the ou -inq 0 he 
core. T e source c n be wi hdrawn rom its in-core posi ion manual I b' me ns 
o an a ached steel cable hat is connec ted 0 top 0 he sourc holder 
cap. An 'ndic or ligh coupled 0 the star up meter at the co rol canso 1 
s 0 s weer he sou rce is in or out 0 the core . 
. 2 ~R~e~~~~~~n~d_B~l~'o~l~o~g~ic~a~I~S~h_i~e~ld 
e re c or core is loca ed within wo co ial tan s. The outer t n is 
in conc e e below loor level . It is 3.7 m in diame te r and has O.32-cm-
s ainless-s eel walls coated wi th a waterproo epoxy resin. The inn r 1S 
2. in diame er and 7.3 m high. This tank is cons tructed 0 0.6 - cm- hic 
elded luminu. The 0.6 m annulus be ween he tanks is filled wi h sand 
A cu aw y vi ew 0 he an is shown in Figure 4.2. Th re is 
o ho i zon a l wa er shielding between the reac t or core nd the 
s'des 0 he aluminu tan The w er level in the tank is main 
cordance wi h he echnical Spec; ications . a minimum 0 18 
op 0 h core 0 provide dequa e radi ion hieldin . a 
ion uel coolin . 
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B rings (see Section 10) . There ar e also several flux-wire i nsert ion holes 
located in the interstices between the fuel element holes of the top grid plate . 
The current core-loading diagram is shown i n Figure 4 . 3. 
The core and its associated components are supported by the lower grid plate, 
which is made of 1. 9-cm-thick alum i num . It is located 15 cm from the base of 
the aluminum reactor tank, resting on six legs . The 0.4S-cm-thick hexagonal 
aluminum core shroud plates are attached to the lower grid plate . The l ower 
grid plate a l so contains 127 positioning holes corresponding to those in the 
upper p l ate for fuel elements and other core components. 
4. 4 Reactor Instrumentation 
The operation of the UUTR is monitored and controlled by safety instrumentation 
channe I s that measure fue I element temperature and reactor neutron f1 ux (power 
level ) . 
Thermocouples i n an instrumented fuel assembly provide information on fuel 
temperature during all operations . The readings are d isplayed on the control 
console and the signals would initiate a reactor scram if safety settings were 
reached . The bu lk reac tor coolant temperature is measured manually with an 
alcohol-filled thermometer placed in the pool water . Three neutron-sensitive 
channels i ndicate power level over the ent ire operat ing range of the reactor 
and ini tiate scram signals if preset power levels are reached . The i nstrumen-
tation and control systems are discussed in Section 7. 
4 . 5 Dynamic Des ign Evaluat i on 
Operation of the UUTR i s accomplished by manipulating control rods in response 
to changes i n parameters such as temperature and neutron flu x (power) measured 
by the instrument channels . There are interlocks to prevent i nadvertent r eac -
t ivi ty add iti ons and a scram system to initiate a rapid shutdown (reactor sc ram ) 
if a preset power limi t has b@~ n reached . In add i tion , the unique characteris-
tics of the U-ZrHx fuel-moderator material prov i de a large , prompt, negati ve 
t empe r atu re coeff ici ent that reduces the reactivity in the event of a signi fi-
cant increase in fue l temperature . This provides additional operat ing s tab ility 
and sa fety during any transient . The negative temperature coefficient resu lts 
princ i pally f rom the neutron spectrum hardening properties of ZrH at elevated 
temperatures, which i ncrease the neutron leakage from the fuel-be~ring mater ial 
into the water moderator mater i ai, where the r emode r ated s lowe r neut rons are 
absorbed preferent i a lly. 
4. 5. 1 Excess Reactiv i ty and Shutdown Margin 
The Technical Specifi cations require that the control rods provide a shutdown 
margin greate r than 0. 35% t.k/k (0 . 50S) wi t h the highest wo ,· th con tro l rod 
fully withdrawn and with the highest worth nonsecured experiment in i t s most 
reactive s tate under any cond itions of ope r ation . 
The Techn i cal Specificat ions for the UUTR limit the ma xi mum core excess eacti-
vity to 1.96% t.k/k (2 . S0S) above the cold, cl ean, critical, xenon-free condition . 
The Technical Specif ications limit experiment re activity worths t o 1.96% :'k/ k 
(2 . S0S) for any single experiment and 0. 7% :'k/ k (1.00S) for any single nonse-
cured experiment . 
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The current core configurat ion has an excess reactivity of 0 . 83% llk/k. The 
i nd iv idual contro l rod worths are shown in Table 4.1 ; the total rod worth is 
2 . 64% llk/k. The shutdown margin for the current core configuration with the 
h i ghest worth rod fully withdrawn is 0.57% ~k/k (= (2 . 64 - 1.24) - 0.S3) . 
Therefore , the current core configuration meets both the shu tdown and the ex-
cess reactivity r equirements. With a ll rods fully inse rted, the core is sub-
critical by 1.8U; llk/k (2 . 59$ ). 
Secause of the homogeneous mix ing of the uranium and IrH
x
' the IrH
x 
temperature 
r ises simultaneously wi th power and the negati ve temperature coe fficient prompt-
ly decreases the reactivity. Add i tionally, the Doppler broadening of the 23 8U 
resonances at hi gher fuel temperatures further contri butes to the prompt, nega-
t ive temperature coeffic i ent as i t ir,c reases nonf i ssioning neu tron capture, 
thus reduc i ng the neutrons available to i nduce fissions ( Simnad et aI., 1976 ; 
GA-4314 , 19S0) . This inherent shutdown property o f U-IrH fuel has been the 
bas i s for des i gn i ng the TRIGA reactors wi th a pulsing cap~bility as a normal 
mode of operat i on . The automat i c compensat i on prov i ded by the prompt, negative 
tellperature coefficient for excess reactiv i ty insertion~ is capab le of termi-
nati ng result i ng power excursions in the pulsing mode without using any mech-
an ica l or e l ectr ical safety systems or operator action. Even though the UUTR 
does not operate in the pu lse mode , this f eed-back mechanism serves as a backup 
saf~ty feature to the protecti ve systems for the mitigation of accidental reac -
tivity insert i on effects and to help maintain constant power (temperature) 
dur ing normal manual operat ion (Simnad et aI., 1976; GA-4314, 19S0) . (See also 
Section 14 . 2 . ) 
4 . 5 . 2 Norma l Operating Conditions 
The temperature in a standar'd TRIGA fuel element i n the UUTR core is limited 
by the Technical Spec ificat ions t o a maximum of 10000 C for stainless-steel -
clad high-hydr i de fuel e l ement s and to 530°C for aluminum-clad low-hydride fuel 
e l ements under any reactor operat ing conditions. These s afety l imits are im-
posed to prevent excessive stress on the cladd ing because of the hydrogen 
pressure caused by the di sassoc i at i on of the zircon i um- hydr i de fue I-moderator. 
Based on the theoretical and exper imental ev idence (Si mnad et aI., 1976 ; GA-4314, 
19BO)' these limits represent conser'la t ive va l ues to provide confidence that 
the integr i ty of the fuel elements wi 11 be ma i ntained and that no claddi ng 
damage will occur . The lice nsee's Technical Spec ificat ions include limiting 
safety sys t em settings to ensure that there is a consi derable margin of safety 
before the safety limits specified above are reached. The limiti ng safety sys-
tem temperature settings depend on the location of both the inst rumented fuel 
element and the aluminum-clad fuel elements . For this r eason , the licensee 's 
Techn ical Spec i fications contain several limi t ing safe t y system tempe ra ture 
sett i ngs that vary with the location o f the ins t r umented fuel element and the 
re a ini ng core configuration. The max i mum l imiting safety temperature sett i ng 
(ins trumented fue l element in the B ring) for a mixed core wi th the aluminum 
cl ad e lements in the F and G rings only is aoooc . For mixed core s wi t h aluminum-
cl ad elements in one of the inner rings (B through E). the maximum (8 ring) 
lj"iting safety system emperature s e t ing i s 460°C . In t he c urrent core con-
f i gura ion he UUTR is operating wi th a 460°C fuel tempera ure scr m setting, 
while he max i mum eas u 'ed temperature in he UUTR f ue l during normal full-power 
opera ions is 112°C, prov id ing a conservat i vely wi de marqin a sa e y . 
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4 . 5 .3 Assessment 
The staff concludes that the control and instrumenta tion systems, supplemented 
by the i nherent, large, prompt, negative temperature coefficient of reactivity 
for the U-IrH
x 
fuel-moderator provide bases for the safe operation and controlled 
s hutdown of the UUTR both in normal operation and i n the event of inadvertent 
insertion of all excess reactivity authorized by the Technical Specifications 
( see Section 14). 
The safety 1 imits for the UUTR are based on theoretical and experimental in-
ve s t i ga t ions and are co ns i s tent wi th those used at other TR IGA- type reactors . 
Also , the operating data at the maximum authorized reactor power provide con-
fidence that the ma ximum fuel element temperatures will be maintained far below 
the prescribed safety limits . TRIGA reactors using stainless-steel-clad fuel 
elements ( > 1. 6 hydrogen- to- z i rconi um rat i 0) have been operated wi th the ma x imum 
fue I temperature we II be 1 ow the safety I imi t at power I eve 1 s up to "-I. 5 MW 
(Simnad et aI. , 1976; GA-4314, 19S0) . TRIGA reactors using aluminum-clad fuel 
el ements with a hydrogen-to-zirconium ratio of 1.0 have demonstrated safe and 
reliable ro utine operations at power levels up to 250 kW (Simnad, et aI. , 1976). 
On the bas i s of the above considerations, the staff concludes that there is 
reasonable assurance that the UUTR can be operated safely at 100 kW, as 1 imited 
by the curren t Technical Specificat i ons requirements. 
4. 6 Func ti onal Design of Reactivity Control Systems 
The power level of t he UUTR is controlled by three control rods ( one s him, one 
regulat ing , and one safety rod), al l of which contain solid bor'on carb ide a s 
the neutron absorber . The locations i n the core of the three rods are shown 
in Figure 4.2 . The rods are moved vertically using identical winch-type 
e lectro-mechanical Jr i ves for each control rod. 
Each rod d,· i ve sys tem is energ i zed f rom the contro 1 conso 1 e through its own i n-
dependent circu i t s; a manual scram at the con t rol console is possible for each 
i ndi vidua l con tro l rod, or they can be scrammed as a group, either manua lly or 
automatica lly . by the safe t y circuits . 
4 .6 . 1 Con tro l Rod Drive Assemblies 
The drive a ssemb lies for the con trol rods are mo unted below floor level on a 
concrete s ~elf a lo ngsi de the reactor pit and consist of an electr ic mo t o" 
coupled t o a brake. a ca b le drum, a speed-reducing gear drive system. and limit 
swi tches . 
If e lectrlcal power to the e l ectromagnets is in te rrupted for any reason, the 
arma ures on he control rods are released and the cont,'ol rod s fall by gravi y 
,nto the .ore. rapi d ly s hutting down the reactor (scramming) . Addi t ion 1 in-
forma t ion on the con t ,'ol rod drive assembl ies is in Section 7. 1. 2 . 
4 . 62 Scram -Logic Circu i t ry and Inter loc ks 
The ,cr m- logic crrcui "y and in te rlocks ensure that sever 1 reac t or co re and 
operational conditions are satisf ied for re c to r oper tion t o oCCU" or con t,nue . 
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The scram-logic c i rcu i try uses an open-on-loss-of-power-to-circu i t logic; that 
i s, any scram signal deenergizes the electromagnets holding the control rods, 
causing the rods to drop and shut down the reactor. In addition , a scram is 
i ni t i ated i f hi gh voltage to the i on chambers is lost or the console power 
c i rcuit fa il s. Interlocks are i ntegrated into the control rod c i rcuitry to 
prov i de additional safety ; fo r example, interlocks prevent the si multaneous 
wi thdrawal of two control rods . Also, there must be an adequate neutron source 
s i gnal avai l able in the startup channel or rod withdrawal is prohibited . This 
ensur es that the instrumentation is mon i toring the neutron flux and related 
cond i t i ons of reactiv i ty . 
4. 6. 3 Assessment 
The UUTR i s equipped wi th safety and control systems, control rods, rod drives, 
scram- l ogi c c i rcu i try, and inter l ocks that have performed re 1 i ab ly and sat i s-
factor i ly i n the UUTR for many years, and at the University of Ar i zona before 
that . 
The contr o l systems allow for an orderly approach to criticality and for safe 
shutdown of the reactor dur i ng normal and abnormal conditions . There i s suffi-
cien t redundancy of control rods to ensure safe reactor shutdown, even if the 
most react ive rod fa i ls to insert on receiving a scram signal. Inte r locks pre-
vent inadver tent rod wi thdrawa 1 and , thus, pos it i ve react i v i ty changes . A 
manua l sc r am button allows the operator to initiate a scram independently for 
any cond i t io n requ iri ng a prompt shutdown . In addition to the active electro-
mechani ca l contro l and safety systems, the large , prompt, negative temperatu r e 
~~~~~~C!: ~!t~f f;:~~;!~i ty i nherent in the U-ZrHx fuel-moderator provi des a 
Add itiona lly, the UUTR is a <20% enriched 235U reactor . Thus, 80% of the f uel 
i s composed of 238U. Because 238U has strong absorption resonances , i ts re son-
ance peaks widen as t he fue l temperature increases (Dopple r ef fec t ) , thereby 
increas ing the probabi 1 i ty of neutron capture dur i ng slowi ng down and reduc ing 
the ava il able neutrons tha t can ca use f i ss ion . Thi s i nherent featu re enhanc es 
the prompt negative temperatu r e coeffic i ent. 
On the bas is of the above d i scuss ion, t he staff conc ludes that t he r eact i vi t y 
con rol systems of the UUT R are designed adequate ly and wi 11 f unction to prov i de 
reasonable assurance of sa fety fo r the reac to r as a whole as we ll as for the 
fue 1 e l ements . 
4. 7 Operational Proc edures 
The UUTR operates under Technical Specifications tha t d irect t he operat ion . 
aud i t , and surve ill ance of the reactor and prov i de procedura 1 rev i ews for all 
safety-related activities . Wri t t en procedures have been es t abli s hed for sa fety-
related and operat ional act i vit i es tha t include reactor s t a r t up , operation. and 
shu down ; ma i ntenance; and cali brat ion of equi pme nt and inst r ume ntation . In 
add ition, the reactor is opera t ed by trained NRC-l icensed pe r sonnel in accord-
ance wi h the above-mentioned procedure s and Tec hni ca l Specifications . 
4. 8 Conclusion 
The staff review of the UUTR facili ty has i ncluded s tudy ing i t s specific desi gn 
and ins a llation, i ts contro ! and safety sv< ems . and its operating procedu r es . 
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As noted earlier, these features are similar to those typical of the research 
reactors of the TRIGA type operating in many countries of the world, 24 of which 
are 1 i censed by the NRC . There are currently 11 TRIGA reactors operating at 1 
MW or greater with no safety-related problems. On the basis of the review of 
the UUTR and experience with these other facilities, the staff concludes that 
there is reasonable assurance that the UUTR, as limited by its Technical Speci-
fications, is capable of continued safe operation . 
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5 REACTOR COOLANT AND ASSOCIATED SYSTEMS 
The reactor coolant-moderator at the UUTR is deionized light water . The heat 
generated within the fuel during reactor operation is transferred to the pool 
water by natural convection and by evaporative cooling i nto the reactor room 
air . The coolant is circulated using a centrifugal PIMIIP, and a portion of the 
circulating coolant is diverted through an ion exchange purification system. 
5. 1 Primary Coolant Circulation System 
The primary cooling system consists of the reactor pool, the primary coolant 
pu.p, and a fan used to blow air across the pool surface to provide the prin-
cipal heat sink. The heat exchanger system described in the SAR was not put 
into operation. The coolant water from the pool is withdrawn at a rate of 
~50 gal/min (13 .15 L/s) using a centrifugal pump and circulated through a closed 
loop to i mprove convective mixing. Figure 5. 1 i s a schematic of the primary 
cool ing and purification systems . 
The inl et line of the c irculation loop has a small hole ~0 . 61 m below the top 
of the reactor pool that acts as a siphon break and prevents draining of the 
r eactor pool i n case of external pipe rupture . The pool water temperature 
nonnally is maintained at about 15.6°C. Admin i stratively, pool water tempera-
ture is not allowed to ri se above 35°C . The pool has a water level monitor 
that alarms when the pool water level falls >0. 61 m below the top of the tank . 
5. 2 Primary Coolant Purificat i on System 
The coolant purif ication loop is a side-stream of the c irculation loop . It 
conta i ns two part iculate filters, and a mixed-bed demineralizer unit . This 
loop is provided with instruments to monitor the temperature and conduct i vi ty 
of the water i nlet to the demineralizer and the conductivity of the effluent 
from the demineralizer . The demineral izer is a steel tank containing ~0 . 08 m3 
of mixed bed resin . Ionized species of water-soluble materials are removed by 
the demineral i zer during the passage of water through this unit . Water from 
the pool is circulated through the ion exchanger at a flow rate ~3 to 4 gal/min 
through a manually adjustable bypass valve in the circulation loop . Conductivity 
probes located at the inl et and outlet of the demineralizer unit determine the 
effectiveness of the water purification system. A thermocouple in the inlet 
line of the de",ineral izer monitors the water temperature . 
The conductivity of the pr imary cooling water is maintained at less than 
5.,,,,hos/cm . The pH of the pool water is mai ntained i n the range of 5. 0 to 
8 . 0 in con formance with the Technical Specifi cations. 
5. 3 Primary Coolant Makeup System 
The loss of coolant from the pool because of evaporat i on averages ~25 gal/day 
during reactor operation with the fan on . The pool water makeup system consists 
of a flexible hose from the city water line that allows water to pass through 
the demineralizer before it enters the reactor pool ; this dem i neralizer system 
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is the same as the primary coolant purification system. During the addition of 
makeup water , the coo 1 ant purif i cat ion 1 i ne is closed us i ng a set of manually 
operated va 1 ves. 
5. 4 Conclusion 
The staff concludes that the cooling system for the UUTR, combined with the 
administrative controls, is adequate to ensure cooling of the reactor under 
operating conditions specified in the UUTR operating license . On the basis of 
the above observat ions, the s ta ff conc 1 udes that the reactor cool i ng and 
purificat i on systems at UUTR are acceptable for contioued safe operation . 
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Figure 5.1 Schematic of pr imary cooli ng and purification syste",s 
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6 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES 
Engineered safety features are those features or systems that mitigate the poten-
tial consequences of accidents. The one engineered safety feature associated 
with the UUTR facility is the ventilation system. This system is designed to 
1 imit the uncontrolled release of airborne radioactive materials during normal 
operating conditions as well as accident conditions . 
6. 1 Ventilation System 
The reactor area has a ventilation system that is separate from that of the 
rest of the Merrill Engineering Build i ng . The ventilation system for the reactor 
area i s designed so that the air in this area changes at least four times per 
hour . 
Fresh air is drawn into the building at the roof level . After appropr iate 
processing (filtering, heating, or cooling) it is distributed throughout the 
building. A local thermostat i n the reactor area controls the dampers to this 
area . Temperatures and static pressures in the main supply are maintained by 
automatic controls under the control of the Physical Plant Center for the 
University. In the reactor area, the ventilation system has additional damper 
and static pressure controls as well as isolation dampers . The additional 
damper in the ventilation system is designed to regulate the air supply to the 
reactor room so that a negative pressure can be maintained . The isolation 
damper operates in the event of an emergency to close off the air supply to the 
reactor room. 
Air discharge from the reactor room is accompl ished through the laboratory 
exhaust vents in Rooms 1001F and 1001G (see Figure 4. 1) . The duct also receives 
exhaust from the hoods in the r adiochemistry laboratories and the pneumatic 
transfer system . These exhausts operate at all times and maintain a flow rate 
of about 1BOO ftl/min (8.5 x lOs cml/s). The exhaust is powered by a fan located 
on the roof of the build i ng, and the discharge is ~10 ft (~3 m) above the pent-
house roof . The exhaust is equipped with a bypass HEPA filter system, which 
will be da pered in to operation when there is a suspected release of airborne 
radioactivity in the reactor area . The flow rate of air through the HEPA filter 
system is estimated at 148 ftl / min (7 x 10' cml/s) . The emergency purge exhaust 
is ac tuated by a cont i nuous air monitori ng sys tem i n the exhaust duct or by the 
area IIIOnitor in the reactor room. The details of the ventilation system are 
s hown schematically in Figure 6.1. 
6. 2 Conclusion 
The venti lation system at the UUTR fac i I ity is designed adequately to isolate 
the reactor area from adjacent areas of the facil i ty and fro", other areas of 
the bu lid i ng . The reactor area vent i I at i on sys te", and equi Pllltnt are adequate 
to control the release of airborne rad ioactive effluents during nOrMal opera-
ions i n cOtllpliance with regulations and to I imi t cred i ble potent ial releases 
of a i rborne rad ioactivity in the event of abnormal conditions . Therefore, the 
s taff concludes that this engineered safety feature is acceptable for continued 
operation of the UUTR . 
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Un i versity of Utah SER 6-2 
uttT ,,"IIV IUlllilf ( 
7 CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM 
The .ajor components of the UUTR control and instr umentation system, including 
rod controls, annunciators, pen recorders, and meters, are located in the 
control console . Control of the nuclear fission process is achieved by using 
three scralllllable control rods . Currently, the UUTR does not have instrumentation 
for either the autOlllatic or pulse IIIOdes of operation and thus operates only 
in the manual IIIOde. 
The console instruments and the reactor area are observable by the reactor 
operator during reactor operation. The important and necessary information for 
reactor operation and safety is readily available to the operator and is dis-
played and annunciated in such a manner on the control console that it minimizes 
the chances of confusing the infonnation with other less essential information . 
7. 1 Reactor Control System 
The control system at the UUTR facility, which consists of both nuclear and 
process instru.entation, provides reactor control during normal operations 
and ensures safe shutdown in the event of abnormal operation . Interlocks are 
provi ded between the instrumentation system and the scram system to provide 
pos i t i ve control of the reactor and to limit the chances of accident conditions. 
7. 1. 1 Control Rods 
The reactor uses three control rods : a safety rod, a regu I at i ng rod, and a 
sh im rod . These control rods are connected to i dentical electromechanical 
dr i ve uni ts . The descript i ons , core pos i tions , and reactivity worths of the 
rods are di scussed i n Sect i on 4 . 
7. 1. 2 Contro l Rod Dr i ve Assemb l ies 
The e lectrOlllechan ica l control rod drive assembl i es consist of a motor and 
reduct ion gea r dr iving a wi nch. A hel i pot connected to the drive unit generates 
the rod posi t ion i nd i cat ion . A stainless-steel cable connects the holding 
magnet at t he upper end of the control rod to the control rod drive assembly . 
In the event of i nterrupt ion of e lectr i cal power or a scram signal , the control 
rod magnets are deenerg ized and the rods fall by gravity into the core. The 
rod dri ve IIOtor i s nonsynchronous, single-phase, electrically reversible and 
wi 11 insert or wi thdr aw the control rods at an average rate of --0 . 003% 6k/k/s 
for the safety and shim rods and 0. 001% 6k/k/s for the regulating rod . The 
max i mum react i vi ty inse r ti on rate by a control rod is limited by the Technical 
Specificat ions to <0. 21% 6k/k/s (0 . 30$/s) . Electrical , dynamic , and static 
brak ing of the control rod dri ve IIOtors prov i de fast s tops and l i mi t the 
coas t i ng or overtrave I of the rods . Fi gures 7. 1 and 7. 2 show the UUTR contro I 
rods and dr ive assembl i es . A key- locked switch on the control console power 
supp ly preven t s the unauthor i zed operat i on of the control rod drives . Limit 
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Figure 7.1 UUTR control rod as sembly 
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Figure 7. 2 Control rod drive mechanism 
swi tches lIOunted on the dri ve assetllb ly actuate c i rcui ts that s top the rod dr i ve 
IIIOtor at the top and bottOll of travel and provide switching for console lights 
that indicate (1) the OIagnet "Up" and "Down" positions a~d (2) the magnet in 
contact with the control rod anoature . 
7. 1.3 Rod Control Ci rcui t 
The rods are controlled individually through a selector switch on the control 
panel. The following interlocks prevent the upward movement of the rods: 
(1) source channel instr~ntation below preset level «2 counts/ s) 
(2) selector switch liOlits operation to one rod-drive circuit at a time 
(3) OIagnet not in contact with armature 
He 1 i pots connected to the rod dri ve uni ts prov i de i ndi cat i on on the conso 1 e 
of the positions of the lift i ng magnets . Rod position repeatability is accurate 
to wi thin ... 2%. 
7. 2 Scram System and Interlocks 
The scram system c i rcu i try is i ndependent of the otner control system circuits . 
All scram cond i t i ons are indicated by annunciators in the reactor console . 
The Techn i cal Spec i ficat i ons for the UUTR require the operability of several 
safety system channel scrams during reactor operation . 
The manua l scram may be i ni t i ated for e i ther individual control rods or for 
a ll contro l rods together . A set of bistable trip-operated relay c i rcuits is 
l ocated in the startup count rate, fuel temperature, power level , and percent 
power pane l s, and another set of two relay-operated annunciators i s located in 
t he contro l console panel. The reactor scram is designed to interrupt the 
magnet cur r ent and result i n the immediate gravity i nsertion of the control 
rods under any of the fo ll ow i ng conditions (Techn i ca l Specifications and 
ope rat ing set po i nts are li sted i n Table 7. 1) : 
( 1) hi gh neutron f lux l eve ls on safety channels 
( a ) log N channe l 
(b) li nea r powe r channe l 
(c) percent power channe l 
(2) power supp ly fai l ure 
(a) ion chambers high vo 1 tage 
(b) conso l e powe r ci r cui t 
(c) fi ss ion chamber hi gh vol tage 
(d ) power t o scram relay buses 
(3) high fue l temperatur e 
(4) low r eac tor poo l wate r l eve l 
(5) anual ini t i at ion 
(6) anua l key swi t ch f or e l ec tr i cal power 
University of Ut ah SE R 7-4 
-:l.1 ~ESl CO~y AVAILABLE . 
Table 7. 1 Minimum reactor safety channels 
Safety Channels 
Startup channel 
Log-N 
Linear power level 
channel 
Percent power level 
channel 
Console scram button 
Chamber high voltage 
Magnet current 
key swi tch 
S i mu I taneous wi th-
drawal of two rods 
Withdrawal of shim 
before safety rod 
fully withdrawn 
Reactor tank wate r 
level 
Fue I temperatur e 
Consol e powe r 
Function 
Prevents wi th-
drawa 1 of any 
control rod 
Scram 
Scram 
Scram 
Manual scram 
Scram 
Manual scram 
Pr~vents wi th-
drawal 
Prevents wi th-
drawal 
Scram 
Scram 
Scram 
Technical 
Specification 
Requirement 
<2 counts Is 
120% of 
full power 
120% of full 
power 
Scram 
Scram 
Prevents with-
drawal 
Scram at 1 ft 
below normal 
operating 
level 
Sc ram at or 
below safety 
sys tem set t i ng 
Scram on loss 
of electr ical 
power 
Set Point 
50 counts/s 
150 kW 
100% of full scale 
recorder (100 kW) 
115% of scale 
Fail ure of power 
supply 
Scram 
If water level 
drops 2 ft below 
the top of the 
tank 
Sc ram on 
fai lure of 
power supply 
"Technical specifi cat ion l imits aluminum fuel in B ring to 460°C . 
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7.3 Instrumentation System 
The reactor instrumentation systelll is fully integrated with the control and 
scram systems to form a single comprehensive system. Both nuclear and nonnuclear 
parameters are measured and monitored by the system. The minimum reactor 
safety channels required by the UUTR Technical Specifications are provided in 
Table 7.1. 
With the instrument chassis power on, the neutron detector power supply, 
source range count-rate circuit, water conductivity monitor, bulk water 
temperature monitor circuits, and reactor tank water level ~onitor are 
continuously active . The console power supply switch provides power to the 
remaining circuits, except for control rod aagnet power which is obtained only 
with a key switch on the console . Key operation ensures that only authorized 
operation of the reactor is performed without impeding the checkout and cali-
brat i on of the instrument channels . Important monitoring circuits remain 
cont i nuous ly act i ve, which allows rapid evaluation of reactor conditions while 
checkouts and calibrations are performed . The instrumentation system is 
des igned to enab le the operator to activate various safety and control circuits 
for opt i um system performance during operations of the reactor. Figure 7.3 
s ows the reactor ins trumentation for the UUTR . 
7. 3. 1 eutron Moni t or ing Channels 
The nuclear ins t rumenta tion is des i ~ned to provide the operator with the 
necessary info ation for proper man i pulation of the reactor controls . The 
neutron onitor i ng channels cons is t of a startup channel , a log-N and period 
ch nn 1, nd two power-l evel scram channels . Table 7. 2 gives the operating 
r nges nd trip set points of these neutron detector channels . All neutron-
s ns in c b rs r seal ed in a1umi n cans and mounted in the water reflector 
on e outs ide of he core 50 t hat the i r positions are adjustable vertically to 
ch ng sensi t i vi y nd for calibrat ion. 
T 
o U 
r 
n 
fissi on chamber, power supply, preamplifier, 
nd 10g-count-rate circuits . The channel provides 
("'10- 3 W) to "'10 W. In addition, a 
withdrawal unless the measured 
compensated ion chamber, a power supply, a 10ga-
t r, nd 10g-N recorder . Log-N power is indicated on 
r corder and covers a range ~rom less than 1 W to 
r ( 100 kW) . 
channel consis ts of an uncompensated ion chamber, 
1 scr m amp l if i er , and percent power recorder . Power 
pro i d d f ro 0% to >150% ( >150 kW) of full licensed 
prov i d s for an dj ustab1e level scram wi thin this range 
115 of sc l e) . 
v 1 c 
P 1 ifi 
SF 
nn 1 incorpor tes an uncompensated i on chamber, a 
r w h n inpu -r nge swi tch , and a power level 
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Figure 7. 3 Block diagram of nuclear instrumentation 
Table 7.2 Operating range s of UUTR neutron detectors 
Operational 
Chamber or Alarms and Trip 
Channe l Detector Ranges Set Po i nts 
Sta r tup - Fi ssi on chambe r 10-3 W to 10 W 2 counts/ s 
Log Count Rate (1 cps to 10, 000 cps) 
Log-N Compensated i on <1 W to >300 kW 150 kW 
chamber 
Linea r Powe r Uncompensated <3 W to 300 kW 100% of scale 
Leve l ion chambe r 
Percent Power Uncompens a t ed o - 150% Power <120% licensed 
level ion c hambe r power 
recorder or meter output (one pen of the dua I-pen recorder) . It prov i des power 
level i ndication from "'3.0 W t o above fu ll li censed power ( >100 kW) and has a 
range swi tch wi th two ranges per dec ade f or accurate mea s urement s of the ion 
chamber current . If the power leve l inc r eases t o 100% of full scale of the 
recorder on any range, a linear power l eve l scram occurs. The output of the 
linear power level channel is recorded on t he s econd pen o f t he dual - pen 
recorder. 
All nuclear channels include a mea ns of ca li br at i ng and te s t i ng the i r tr i p 
levels . These calibration and test circui t s a r e built i nto the console as 
part of each channe l. Figure 7. 4 indica tes the ope ra t i ng ranges o f the 
neutron detectors . 
7. 3 . 2 Temperature and Water Monitor Channe ls 
A fuel temperature channel with a meter readout and associa ted sc r am circu i t r y 
i s mounted in the canso Ie . The channe lis prov i ded with a t e s t swi tc h on the 
fran panel to allow checkout of the fuel temperature scram circuits . The 
reactor tank wate r level is monitored by a float swi t ch . A microswitch l evered 
a the float actuates an alarm and reactor scram if the water level drops to 
>0 . 61 m be l the top of the tank . (This corresponds to "'6 . 4 m of wate r above 
the top of he core . ) 
The wa ter conduct ivity monitor consists of conductivity probe s located i n t he 
coolant pur i f ication loop and a Wheatstone bridge circuit. The conduc tivi ty 
output i s di sp I ayed on the reac tor canso Ie. 
7 4 Cone I us i on 
The contra I and i ns t r umentat i on sys tems at the UUTR are de s i gned to prov i de 
re li ab il ity nd flex i b il ity . There is adequate redundancy and diversity in 
nuc lear nd teMper ture monitoring circuits . In particular, nuclear powe r 
sureMnts re overlapped in the ranges of the log- N, linear powe r, and pe r-
cent r l eve l channels . On the basis of the above i nforma tion, the sta f f 
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concludes that the control and instrumentat i on systems at the UUTR comply with 
the requ i rements and perfo r mance objectives of the Technical Spec if~cations 
and applicable regulations and are acceptable to ensure safe operatlon and 
shutdown of the reacto r . 
10 ' 
10 ' 
-
10 • 
-
10 
, 
-In 
10 2 ~ 
-i 
-' 10 1 \01 
-> 
\01 
-' 0 
II: 10 
-\01 
~ 
0 
D- 10 
1 
10 2 
- ) 
10 
--
-I"" --
Jt.--'.N <H ..... 
4-COMPENSATED ION CHAMIER 
LINEAR RECORDER 
,4---t--'COMPENSATED ION CHAMIER 
LOG-" RECORDER 
(S'ARE) 
-I-
~ ' -----·'--"ISSION CHAIIIIER 
--
-~ 
I CISEC 
Figure 7. 4 Operating range of neutron detectors 
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8 ELECTRIC POWER 
8 . 1 Electrical Power System 
The electrical power for building lighting and reactor instrumentation is 
single-phase, 60 Hz, 1201240 V, which is furnished through a transformer and 
severa 1 control pane 1 s located throughout the buil di ng. 
8 . 2 Ellergency Power 
The reactor will sera. in the case of an electrical power interruption and 
because the decay heat generated in the core following a scram is not enough 
to cause fuel dalllage (see Section 14), emergency power is not required to main-
tain the reactor in a safe shutdown condition . Power for the radiation monitors 
and the fac iIi ty i ntrus i on detectors is supp 1 i ed by a 12-V battery that is 
trickle-charged continuously. In the event of an el ectr ical outage, this 
battery would supply the necessary power for these instruments for about 24 
hours . Battery-powered eMergency 1 ighting also is avai lable to faci 1 itate 
personnel -avement during a power outage . 
8 . l Conclusion 
The staff concludes that the design of the electrical power system, coupled 
with the i nherent safety of the reactor design. is acceptable for continued 
operat ion of the UUTR . 
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9 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS 
The auxil iary systems considered are the provlslons for fire protection , the 
fuel handling and storage system, the compressed air system, and the heating 
and air conditioning sys tems. 
9.1 Ventilation System 
The ventilation system is considered to be an engineered safety feature and is 
discussed in Section 6 of this report. 
9.2 Fire Protection System 
The fire protection system for the reactor facility has sprinklers located 
throughout the reac tor area, and there are two portable fire extinguishers 
available at this location. A smoke detector located in the radiochemistry 
laboratory also provides fire a larms . These units are maintained by the campus 
Fire Marsha 11. 
Additional fire protection to the reactor is provided by the Salt Lake City 
Fire Department with a fire station located on the university campus. Both the 
personne 1 of the campus Fire Marsha 11 and the Sa It Lake City Fire Department 
are instructed periodically on the special needs of fire protection at the 
reactor facility by the staff of the Radiation Protection Department. 
9. 1 Fue 1 Handl i ng and Storage 
Fuel handl ing at UUTR is performed using special tools designed and built by the 
reactor vendor . The fue 1 storage sys tem cons i s ts of s ix fue 1 storage rac ks 
mounted inside the reactor tank . Currently, the in-tank s torage fac i lity ha s a 
maximum capacity for 91 fuel elements ; 46 fuel elements are in storage on these 
racks at the present time . Two other fuel elements are stored in two separate 
shielded facilities on the lower level floor in the reactor bay (see Figure 4.1) . 
The fuel storage racks are designed for adequate cooling and shielding and to 
provide assurance that inadvertent critica lity cannot occur. 
9. 4 Compressed Air System 
A lO-psig compressed air 1 ine serves the two hoods in the radiochemistry labora-
tories and the counting laboratory . These 1 ines are extensions of the compressed 
air sys tem for the Merrill Engineering Building using a compressor located outside 
of the reactor area . 
9. 5 Heating and Air Conditioning Systems 
The heat i ng and air condi t i on i ng sys tems i n the reac to r area are integrated 
with the heating and air conditioning systems for the rest of the Merrill 
Engineering Building . Air is heated using a gas-fired boiler . The reactor 
area is cooled usi ng chilled air drawn through the air inlet, which also is 
part of the Merrill Engineering Bu i ld ing air conditioning system . 
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9.6 Conclusion 
The staff concludes that the auxiliary systems at UUTR are adequately designed 
and llaintained and the systems are acceptable for their intended purposes . 
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10 EXPERIMENTAL PROGRAMS 
The UUTR supports educational programs in physical, biological, and medical 
sciences and for the t r aining of eng ineering students on the campus of the 
University of Utah. The reactor also is a source of ionizing r adiations and 
neutrons for various research programs . The experimental facilities of the 
UUTR i nc 1 ude a pneumat ic trans fer system , severa 1 centra 1 i rrad i a tors, and 
three diagonal l y directed beam tubes. In addition, there are four ;'Tadiation 
facilities in the trapezoidal 020-filled reflector tanks surrolll1ding the 
reac tor core . 
10.1 Exper imental Facilities 
10.1.1 Cent r al Irradia tor s 
The reactor is equipped with a central thimble for conducting experiments or 
irradiating small samples in the core at the point of maximum neutron flux . 
The central irradiator is a cy lindrical aluminum insert placed i n the A and B 
ring positions of the core. There are three variations of the cen tral irradia-
tors avai lable for use at UUT R. Each of these is "'0 . 11 m i n diameter and 
"'0 . 67 m in height . The three designs allow various optimizat ion ; of neutron 
flu xe s within the irradia t ors. One of them has an in ternal tube "'2. S cm in 
diamete r . and the annulu s of thi s de vi ce is f i lled with O ~ O . A second irradia tor 
wi t h an interna l tube 2 .S cm in diameter ha s an annu l us f1lled with air . The 
third il'rad ia t or ha s s i x inner tubes approxi mately 2.S cm in diamete r arranged 
in a circ le. as s hown in Figure 10 . 1. The annulu s of this irradiator i s f illed 
with O2°. and it ca n be rota ted from the bridge using a motor at a co nstan t 
speed of "' I rpm 0 allow all the six sample positions to be exposed to the 
same neu t ron fluence . The ac tual p lacement of experiments or samples in the 
core r egion is further li mi t ed by the Tech nical Speci ficat ions . 
10 . 1. 2 Pneuma t ic Trans fer Sys tem 
A pneumatic transfer system al lows smal l s ea led sample s to be transpo,·ted 
r ap id ly between the r adi oc hemistry laboratory and the reactor core . The in-co"e 
terminus of his sys tem is loca t ed in one of the fuel element positions in the 
O-ri ng o f the core and the receiver terminus is an uns hielded loca tion in Room 
1001C. The pneumatic transfer sys tem is driven by dry air under press ure . All 
the exha ust air rom the sys tem is released to the venti lation ex haust sys t em 
from the radiochemis t ry laboratories, wh ic h is combi ned wi th the reactor area 
exhaust. The con tro l s for the pneumat ic transfer sys tem are loca ted at the 
receiver terminus . The mechan ical operation of this experimenta l facil i t y 
canno be controlled or observed from the r eac tor console . 
10 . 1. J Diagonal Beam Tubes 
The reacto l' sys tem has three diagonally direc ted beam tube s between the reac tor 
co re and t he reacto r room floor . Each tube is composed o f t wo sections al igned 
along a common ax is . The top tube sec t i on is a 0 . 30-m- d iameter t ube be twee n the 
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reactor floor and the wall of the al uminum tank. This tube does not penetrate 
the aluminum reactor tank, but is sealed at the end where it butts aga i nst the 
reactor tank. Currently, it is filled with sand and capped at the reactor 
floor level with a 0.15-m-thick lead plug . 
10 . 1. 4 OzO-filled Reflector Tank Irradiations 
The trapezo idal 020-fi lled reflector tanks surrounding the reactor core permit 
the i r radiation of experiments submerged i n the vicinity of the core, yet 
inside the refl ector. The decision to perform exper iments in the O~ O reflector 
as opposed to using the pneumatic transfer system or the central thlmble is 
dictated by the nature and size of the specimen and the requ ired type and 
i ntensity of radiation fields . The actual placement of experiments or samples 
in these irradiat i on locations also is limited by the i r potential effect on 
reactivity, which is limited by the TeChnical Specif ica tions . 
There are three wet irradiation tubes in one of the trapezoidal reflector 
tanks and a dry i rradi at i on tube in one of the other 020- fill ed ref! ectors . 
The Internal diameters of the three wet Irradiat ion facilities are ~5 cm . The 
dry Irradiation facility located in the 020 tank is ~0.11 m in diameter and 
~0.67 m in height . 
10 . 2 Experimental Review 
Before any new experiment may be conducted us i ng the reactor or the assoc i ated 
experimental facilities, it is reviewed by the Reactor Operations Committee, 
which has five members . The membership of the Reactor Operations Committee is 
designed to provide a spectrum of expertise to review the experiments and 
the ir potential hazards. The University Radiation Safety Officer and the 
Reactor Supervisor are permanent members of this committee . The review and 
approval process for exper iments also allows personnel experienced In reactor 
operat ions to consider and suggest alternative operational conditions - osuch as 
a different experimental facility, power levels, and ir rad iation times-- that 
might lead to decreased personnel exposure and/or potential release of rad io-
active materials to the environment . 
10.3 Conclusions 
The staff concludes that the design of the experimental facilities, comb ined 
with the detai led review and administrative procedures appl ied to all research 
activities at the UUTR fac i lity, is adequate to ensure that the exper iments are 
(1) unlikely to fail, (2) unl i kely to release si"gnlficant radioactivity to the 
env ironment di rec t Iy. and (3) un like I y to cause damage to the reactor sys tem or 
Its fue 1. There fore, the s taft cone I udes a I so that rea so nab I e prov i s ions have 
been made so that the experimental programs and facilities do not pose a 
significant rad i ological risk to the facility staff or the publ ic . 
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RAOIOACTI E WASTE A AGEMENT 
e ajor radioact i e waste generated by reactor operations is activated gases, 
pri arily ' tAr. A limited vol ume of radioactive solid waste, principally 
spent ion e c ange res ins, is generated by reactor operations; some additional 
so id as e is produced by as sociated research programs . The faci li ty periodi-
c y e enera tes the coo l ant purificat ion ion exchanger resin bed, using the 
serv ices 0 n outs ide con ractor . 
11. 
he UU R is operated i th the philosophy of limiting the release of radioactive 
t 0 he env ironment to l eve ls as low as is reasonably achievable (AlARA). 
he si y dministr ion, through the Rad i at ion Safety Off ice, instructs 
11 ra ·ng and research personnel to develop procedures to li mit the genera-
ion d subse uen rel e se of radioact i ve mater i als . 
1.2 
11 . 2. 1 olid s e 
f 
nd Handling Procedures 
r dio c ive w ste in the form of spent fuel is not 
of his license renewa l . Therefore, the only 
r suI re ctor oper i ons consists primarily of 
ilters nd oce sion I small eti vated components. 
reh 150 r suI s in he gener t ion of soli d 
in the orm of con t mi n t d p per , loves, and 
d h UUTR cili y during the past 
-lived nucl· s, wh ich we r llow d to decay in 
cili y . 
reo eili y re col lee ed by 
speci 11y marked barrels t h t r kept 
eporrily b for be ing p cka ed nd 
in ccordnc~ wi h pplicble regulations . 
11-1 
r than the 
ion products. 
on con t inu-
ner te li mi ted 
col l ee ed and monitored 
bov 10 CF R 20 l imi ts, 
d below h pp lic bl e 
sc i n-
c-
(227 L) of °20 . As of Apr i l 1983 , .the 'H level in t~e 020 w~s - 0. 12 ~Ci/mL, kBq/mL), which amounts to a total Inventory of 30 mCI of 'H In the °20 tanks . 
If all the 227 L of °20 were to be re leased t o th~ reactor .pool water, ~he ' H 
concentration in the pool water would be <10- 1 ~Cl/ml . ThIs concentratIon of 
'H is well below the release limits of 'H accord i ng to 10 CFR 20 criteri a. 
Therefore , the current 'H levels of °20 in the reflector tanks do not constitute 
a radiological safety hazard . 
11 . 2. 3 Airborne Waste 
An activat ion product that can become airborne is '6N, which is produced in 
the coolant pass ing through the reactor core . Calculat ions by the licensee 
ind icate the ' 6N dose at t he pool surface to be ~0.2 mR/h at the maximum 
1 i censed power 1 eve l. 
The major radioact ive airborne waste i s "Ar , wh i ch is produced pr incipally 
by the neutron irrad iat ion of air di ssolved in the cooling wate r and by the 
irradiat ion of air in the pneumatic transfer system. 
The detec tion l evel of "Ar pass ing through the ventilation system, as stated 
by the li censee , is ~0 . 6 x 10-6 ~Ci/mL . Because there have been no measurable 
increases of rad ioactiv ity above background with full-power concentrations of 
"Ar in the effluents pas sing through the ventilation system , the licensee 
est imated that the maxim~ annua l release of "Ar is less than 0. 2 Ci , assumi ng 
an average reactor operation of 10 MWh/yr . This est imate does not include the 
re leases of "Ar from the pneumat ic transfer system, which occur i n bursts when 
a sample is ret ri eved. A conservative est i mate by the staff indicates that 
t hi s add i tional source of "Ar is less than 10 mCi . (See Section 12 .8 for dose 
assessments from "Ar rel eases . ) 
11.3 Conclus ions 
The staff concl udes that the wa,te management activities at the UUTR facility 
have been conducted and are expected to continue to be conducted in a manner 
consis tent wi t h 10 CFR 20 and the ALARA pr inciples . Among other gu idance, tne 
s taf f review has fo ll owed the methods of ANSIIANS 15 . 11, "Radiological 
Control at Research Reactor Facilities . " 
Because "Ar is the only sign i ficant rad ionuclide re leased by the reactor in 
the env i ronment duri ng norma l operat ions , the staff has rev i ewed the history 
and current pract ices of reactor operat ions with respect to this radionuclide . 
The s taff concludes that the concentrat ion of "Ar in unrest ri cted areas as a 
resul t of moni tored re leases has not exceeded the guidelines in 10 CFR 20, 
Appendix 8 , when averaged over a year . Furthermore, the related evaluation of 
the po tent ia l exposure i" the unrestricted areas yives reasonable assu~an~e. 
tha t the exposures to the public as a result of • Ar rel ease are not SIgnIfI cant . 
Univ~rsity of Utah SER 11-2 
# G~ ~ opy AVAIlABLE 
12 RADIATION PROTECTION PROGRAM 
The University of Utah has a structured radiation safety program with a health 
physics staff equipped with radiation detection instrumentation to determine, 
control, and document occupational radiation exposures at its reactor facility. 
In addition, the reactor facility monitors airborne effluents in the exhaust 
duct to ensure compliance with applicable guidelines and regulations . 
12 . 1 ALARA Commitment 
The university administration , through its Radiation Safety Committee, has 
formally established the policy that all operations are to be conducted in a 
manner to keep all radiation exposures ALARA . All proposed experiments and 
procedures at the reactor are reviewed for ways to minimize the potential 
exposure of personnel. All unanticipated or unusual reactor-related exposures 
will be investigated by both the health phys ics and reactor operations staffs 
to develop methods to prevent r~currences . 
12. 2 Health Physics Program 
12 . 2. 1 Health Physics Staffing 
The normal radiation safety staff at the university consists of two professional 
health physicists supported by three full-time technicians . This staff provides 
radiation safety support to the entire university complex, including a teaching 
hospital and many radioi sotope laboratories . The rou~ine health-~hysics : t~pe 
activities at the reactor are pe rformed by the operatIons staff WIth addItIonal 
surveys by the health physics staff . The formal health physics s taff is avail-
able fo r consultation and the un iversity's Rad iat ion Safety Off icer is a member 
of the Reactor Sa fety' Commi t tee . The s taft conc 1 udes that the radi at i on safety 
support is acceptable for the cont i nued use of this reactor facil ity . 
12 . 2.2 Procedures 
Deta iled written procedures have been prepared that address the radiation 
safety support that is expected to be provided to the routine operation .of the 
university's research reactor facility . These procedures ident ify the Inter-
act ions between the operationa l and experi mental personnel and also specify 
numerous administrative limits and action points, as wel l as appropriate 
responses and corrective actions if these limits or action points are reached 
or exceeded. Copies of these procedures are readily available to the opera-
tional and research staff and to the administrative and radiation safety 
personne I. 
1~. 2. 3 Ins trumentat i on 
The university has acquired a variety of de tecting and measuring instruments . 
for monitor i ng potentially hazardous ionizing radiatio~ . The instrume~t ~all­
brat ion procedures and techn iques ensure that any credIble type of radIatIon 
and any s ignificant i ntens i t ies wi ll be detected promptly and measured correctly . 
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I n add i t i on , the reactor facility i s in posses s ion of several por t able survey 
ins truments supplied and ca li brated by Nevada Of f ice of the Department of Energy 
unde r a contr act. 
12. 2 . 4 Tra i ni ng 
All reactor- r elated pe rsonne l are gi ven an indoct r inat i on in r ad i at i on safety 
be fore t hey as s ume the i r work respons i bil i t i es . Additio~al radiat ion safet~ 
instructions a r e provi ded t o those who wi l l be wo r klng dl rectly wlth radlat l on 
or rad i oact ive materials . The training program is designed to identify tile 
haza rds of each specif i c type of work to be underta ken and methods to mitigate 
the ir cons equences . Ret r ain ing i n ra diation saf~ty al so i s provided . . As an 
examp l e . al l reactor operators are gi ven an exam l natlon on health ph~S l C S 
prac t i ces and procedures at l east eve ry 2 yea rs . The level of r etralnlng given 
i s de t erm ined by t he exam i nation results. 
12 . 3 Radi a ti on Sources 
12. 3. 1 Reac tor 
Sour ces of r adi a t ion di r ectl y r e la ted to reactor ope rations i ncl ude radiation 
f r om the r eactor core , f ilters in t he wate r c leanup sys t ems, and rad lOact lVe 
gases ( pr i ma ril y ·'Ar) . 
The fissi on products a re conta i ned i n the f uel 's al umi num- and sta i nles s- s teel 
c laddi ng . Radiat io n expos ures f rom t he r eactor core are r educed to a~ceptable 
l eve ls by water and conc re te sh ieldi ng . The f il te rs are changed ro ut l ne l ~ . 
before hi gh leve ls of radioactive ma te ri al s have accumul ated . the r eby ll ml tlng 
pe rsonne l exposure . 
Personne l exposu r e to the rad iation from t he sma ll amoun ts of chemi call y i ne r t 
" Ar is li mi ted by d il ution and pr ompt remova l of t his gas f rom the r eactor 
area and its disc harge to the a t mos phere where i t dif f us es f urther before 
reaching occup ied a reas ( see Sect i on 12. 8 fo r do se es t imates) . 
12 . 3. 2 Extraneous Sources 
Sou rces of radia t ion t hat may be cons i de r ed as inc idental t o norma l reac to r 
operat ion. but associ ated with reac tor us e . . i nclude rad ioa~ t i ve i sotopes produced 
for research . activa t ed component s o f experIments, and ac tl vated samples or 
specimens. An AGN-201M reac tor li cense d t o operate at a . po~e ~ level o f 5 W is 
located in the same room as t he UUTR, but does not add s lgnl f l cant doses to 
the natura 1 room background . 
Personnel exposure t o ra d iat ion fr~m i ntentiona l ly produced rad ioa~ t ive mate-
r ia l as we ll as from t he requ i red ma ni pu la ti on of act Ivated expe r Imenta l com-pone~ ts. i s controlled by r igidly deve loped ~nd re~ i ewed opera t i n~ pr?cedur es 
hat use the normal pro tec t ive meas ures of tIme . dls tancc , and shl e ldl ng . 
12 4 Rout ine Mon i t oring 
12 . 4. 1 Fixed-Position Moni t ors 
The UUT R facil i ty has two fixed-posi t ion rad iat ion monito r s: one on the ce ili ng 
above the reac tor and anot he r be I ow the catwa 1 k j us t above the reac tor wa t e r 
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level . The outputs of these detectors are summed with that of the exhaust duct 
monitor ( Section 12.6 . 1) and read out in the control room . In the event that 
the sum of these detectors reaches a predetermined value discussed in the SAR, 
the reactor area is isolated automatically and the reactor (if operating) is 
scrammed . 
12 . 4 . 2 Experimental Support 
The health phys ics staff participates in experiment planning by reviewing all 
proposed procedures for methods of minimizing personnel exposures and limiting 
the generat i on of radioactive waste . Approved procedures specify the type and 
degree of radiation safety support required by each activity . 
12 . 5 Occupational Radiat i on Exposures 
12 . S. 1 Personnel Moni to ri ng Program 
The univers ity's personnel monitoring program is described in its Radiation 
Safety Manual. To summarize the program , personnel exposures are measured by 
the use of f i 1m badges as signed to individuals who might be exposed to radia-
tion . Visito rs also may be provided with film badges for monitoring purposes . 
In addition, ins trument dose rate and time measurements are used to administra-
tively keep occupational exposures below the applicable guidelines in 10 CFR 20 . 
12 . 5.2 Personnel Exposures 
Du r ing the almost 10 yea r s s ince the reactor reached initial c r iticality in 
1975 , pe rsonnel exposures a t the UUTR fac ility have been well within 10 CFR 20 
gui de 1 i nes. The on ly annua 1 exposure over 250 mrem was in 1980 when the t r ans-
fer of fuel between the s torage pits and the reacto r tank resulted in one indi -
v idual receiving 234 mrem , contributing s ignifi r. antly to his total expos ure of 
34 ~ mr em fo r the yea r . A s i ng l e i ndiv i dual received exposures of between 100 
and 150 mr em each yea r during 1977 , 1978 , and 1979 . All other pe rs onnel expo-
s ures as soci ated with ope r ati ons and ma intenance of thi s r eactor have been l ess 
than 100 mrem/ yr 0.0 m Sv / y r ). 
12. 6 Eff l uent Monito ri ng 
12 . 6 . 1 Airbo rne Ef fluents 
As di scus sed in Sect i on 11, a irborne rad i oactive e f f l uents from the rea c tor 
f ac il i ty cons is t princ ipa lly of l ow concen tra tions of "Ar . The smal l amoun t 
of .. Ar I'e 1 eased in t o t he reacto r r oom is d i 1 ut ed by the a I mo s t 5 x 108cml 
vo l ume of a ir . The reac t or a r ea exhaust is monitored in t he d i scharge duct by 
an i ns t rument des igned to detect " Ar concentrations of abou t 2 x 10- 6 ~Ci /m L 
(1/ 3 of 10 CF R 20, Appendi x B, res t r ic ted area max i mum permissibl e conce nt ra-
t ion . ) The duc t monitor ins t rumen tation wil l i sola te t he reac t or area, sc ram 
the reactor automat icall y . and swi t ch the HEPA f ilter into t he ex haust s tream 
of the ve ntilat i on sys t em. if th i s va lue is exceeded. Reactor room air is di s-
charged at a ra te o f about 1700 f t l / mi n (8 x l OS mL/s ) a t a poi nt approx imate ly 
12 m above grou nd leve l , result i ng in add iti onal dilu t ion before t he exhaus t 
l ;r reaches occupied areas at gr ou nd l evel. (See Section 12 . 8 fo r do s e 
es t imates. ) 
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12.6 . 2 Liqui d Effluents 
The reactor generates no radioactive liquid waste during routine operations. 
If s~all quant i ties of liquid waste are generated by some clean1ng of dec on-
ta~ination equipment, it will be collected and solidified by th~ Radiat!on 
Safety Office staff, and disposed of off-campus in accordance w1th appl1cable 
regulations . 
12.7 Environmental Monitoring 
A DOE/EPA environmental sampling station (manned by university personnel) is 
l ocated outside the engineering building. This station monitors and record~ 
externa 1 penetrating radi at i on 1 eve 1 s and co 11 ects samp 1 es of a 1 rborne part ~­
culates, water vapor (tritium), and condensable gases for laboratory analys1s . 
In addition the Radiation Safety Office performs routine surveys at selected 
locations a~ound the campus where materials (including radioactive materials) 
tend to concentrate or collect . The infrequent low positive indications cannot 
be correlated with reactor operat i ons , maintenance, or potential releases. 
12 . 8 Potential Dose Assessments 
Natural background radiation levels in the central Utah area result in an expo-
sure of about 115 mrems/yr (1 . 15 mSv/yr) to each individual residing there . At 
l east an additional 7% (approximately 8 mrems/yr) will be received by those 
livi ng in a br i ck or masonry structure. An~ m~dical diagn~sis X-ray examina-
tion will add to the natural background rad1atlOn, 1ncreas1ng the total cumula-
tive annual exposure of individuals . 
Conservat i ve ca lcul at i ons by the staff , based on the amount of 41Ar released 
during normal operat i ons from the reactor facility stack, predict a maximum 
annual exposure of only a fraction of 1 mrem in t he unrestricted areas . 
12 . 9 Conclus i ons 
The staff concludes that radiat ion protection receives appropriate support from 
the un i versity admi nistrat ion, because it has been determined that (l) the pro-
gram is staffed and equi pped properly, (2) the university health physics s~aff 
has adequate author i ty and lines of communication, (3) the procedures are 1n-
tegrated correctly into the research plans, and (4) su rveys ver1fy that opera-
tions and procedures follow ALARA pr inci ples . 
The staff concludes tha t the effluent mon i tor i ng program conducted by university 
personnel i s adequate to identify si gn ificant releases of radioactivity promptly 
so that aximum exposures to ind ivi duals in the unrestricted area can be pre-
dicted and li mited. These pred ic ted max i mum l evel s are well within the appli-
cable regulat ions and guideline s of 10 CFR 20 . 
Finally, the staff concludes that the un ivers ity's rad i ation protection program 
i s acceptable because i t has found no ins tances ?f re~c~or-r~la~e~ exposures of 
personnel above applicabl e regulations and no un1dent1f1ed slgn1f1cant releases 
of radioactivity to the env i ronment . The s taff further concludes that there is 
reasonab l e assurance that the personnel and procedures wi 11 continue to protect 
the hea lth and safety of the publ ic dur i ng continued reactor operations . 
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13 CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS 
13.1 Overall Organization 
Responsibility for the safe operation of the reactor facility is vested within 
the chain of command shown in Figure 13.1. The Director of the Nuclear Engin-
eering Laboratory is delegated responsibility for overall facility operation . 
13 . 2 Training 
Most of the training of reactor operators is done by in-house personnel. The 
licensee's Operator Requalification Program has been reviewed, and the staff 
conc I udes that it meets the app 1 i cab 1 e regul at ions (10 CFR 50 . 54{ i -1) and 
Appendix A of 10 CFR 55) and is consistent with the guidance of ANS 15 . 4. 
13.3 Emergency Planning 
10 CFR 50 . 54{q) and (r) require that a 1 icensee authorized to possess and/or 
operate a research reactor shall follow and maintain in effect an emergency 
plan that meets the requirements of Appendix E of 10 CFR 50 . By letter dated 
November 1, 1982, the licensee transmitted an Emergency Plan in fulfillment of 
the requirements of applicable regulations (Regulatory Guide 2. 6 , Rev . 1. 
March 1982; ANSI/ANS 15 . 16, 19B1 draft). By le tter dated June 28, 1984 , the 
NqC transmitted its approval of the Emergency Plan to the 1 icensee . 
13 . 4 Operational Review and Audits 
The Reactor Safety Committee (RSC) provides independent review and audit of 
facility activities . The Technical Specifications outline the qualifications 
and prov i de that alternate members may be appoi nted by the RSC Chai rman. The 
RSC mus t rev i ew and approve plans for modifi cat ions to the reactor, new exper i-
ments, and proposed changes to the 1 i cense or to procedures . The RSC a 1 so is 
responsible for conducting audits of reactor facility operations and management 
and for reporting the results thereof to the Vice Pres ident for Research of the 
University of Utah . 
13.5 Physical Security Plan 
The UUTR facil ity has establ ished and maintains a program to protect the reac-
tor and its fuel and to ensure its security . The NRC staff has reviewed the 
Physical Security Plan and concludes that the plan, as amended, meets the 
requirements of 10 CFR 73 . 67 for specia l nuclear mater i al of low stra tegi c 
significance . The UUTR facility 's inventory of special nuclear mater i al for 
reactor operation fa II s with i n that category . 
The Physical Security Plan and the staff's evaluation are withheld from public 
di sc losure under 10 CFR 2. 790{ d){ 1) . Amendment No. 4 to the fac i I ity Operat i ng 
License No. R-126 , dated October 17, 1980, incorporated the Phys i ca I Securi ty 
Plan as a condition of the license . 
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13 . 6 Conclusion 
On the bas i s of the above, the staff conc 1 udes that the l i censee has suf f i c i ent 
experience , management structure, and procedures . t o provide r easonable assurance 
that the reactor wi ll be managed i n a way that wl 11 cause no signi f icant r isk 
to the health and safety of the publ i c . 
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14 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 
In establishing the safety of the operation of the UUTR, the licensee analyzed 
credible accidents to ensure that these events would not result in potential 
radiological hazards to the reactor staff or the public . The NRC staff has 
evaluated the licensee's submittal and also has analyzed various types of 
possible accidents and their potential radiological consequences . 
The staff has evaluated and analyzed the following potential accidents or 
events and their consequences for the U-ZrHx fueled UUTR : 
(1) fuel handling accident 
(2) rapid insertion of reactivity (nuclear excurs i on) 
(3) loss of coolant 
(4) misplaced experiments 
(S) mechanical rearrangement of the fuel 
(6) effects of f ue l ag ing 
Of these potential credible events, the one with the potent i al of releasing the 
highest leve l of radi oacti ve material with i n the UUTR facility and to the 
unrestricted area outside the r eactor facility i s a fuel handling accident that 
postulates the loss of i ntegrity of the cladding on an irradiated fuel element 
and the subsequent release of fission products . The staff has designated this 
accident as the maximum hypothetical acc i dent (MHA) . 
The resu 1 ts of the ana lyses of the othe r credi b 1 e events, wi th 1 ess severe con-
sequences than the MHA, are a 1 so addressed in the fo 11 owi ng sect io ns . 
14 .1 Fuel Hand li ng Accident 
The fuel handling acc i dent , which is designated as the MHA for t he UUTR , 
inc ludes va rious incidents to one or more irradiated fuel elements in which the 
fuel claddi ng might be breached or ruptured . 
For the MHA, the staff did not try to develop a detai led scenario of how the 
accident occurs , but rather assumed that the cladding of one irradiated fuel 
element certainly fails and that th is occurs outside the reactor pool in air, 
instantl y releasing all of the available volat il e fission produc ts that have 
accumulated i n the free volume (gap) between the f uel and the cladd ing . Fur-
the rmore, the scena ri o conservatively assumes tha t the accident occurs following 
an extended run at fu 11 licensed power , whereby the inventor i es 0 f a II sign if-
icant radionucl ides are at their ma ximum (saturation) values . 
Several series of experiments at General Atomic (GA) have prov ided data on t he 
species and fractions o f fission products released from U-Z rHx under various 
conditions (GA-8S97, 1968 ; Foushee and Peters, 1971; GA-4314 1980; Simnad et 
a I., 1976 ; 8aldw i n et aI., 1980) . The findings indi cated that the noble gases 
are t he principal fis si on product species released and that when the fuel spec imen 
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was i rradi ated at tetlPeratures be 1 ow 350°C. the fract i on of the tota 1 inventory 
released could be sUlllllarized as a constant equal to 1. 5 x 10-s. independent 
of the tetllperature duri ng i rradi at i on . At temper~tures greate~ than 3500~. ~he 
spec i es released retaai ned the same. but the fract 1 on re 1 eased 1 ncreased s 1 gn1 f-
icantly with i ncreasing temperature. 
GA has proposed a theory describing the release mechanisms i~ the t~o tempera-
ture regimes that appears plausible. but not all data agree 1n deta11. It. seems 
reasonable to accept the interpretation of the low-temperature results. Wh1Ch 
implies that the fraction released for a typical TRIGA (U-ZrHx) fuel element 
wil l be a constant. independent of operating history or .details ?f operating ° 
tet!1peratures. and wi 11 apply to fuel whose temperature 1 s not ra1 sed abo~e "350 C. 
Thi s llIeans that the 1. 5 x 10-s release fraction reasonably cou 1 d be app 11 ed to 
TRIGA-type reactors operating at power levels up to at least 800 kW and. there-
fore is app 1 i cab 1 e to the UUTR 100- kW reactor . The theory for the fuel tempera-
ture ' regil1!e above 'l4000C is not established as well. The proposed theory of 
re 1 ease of the fi ss i on products incorporates a di ffus i on process that is a fu~c­
tion of te.perature and time. Therefore. in principle. details of t~e operat1ng 
history and temperature distribut i ons i n fuel elements would be requlred to 
obtain actual values for release fractions at the higher temperatures. In 
situations where a fue l cladding failure was assu1l1ed . the staff used the GA 
results for the fission product release fractions . The staff considers these 
resu 1 ts to be conservative in that they represent a theoret i ca 1 max i mum re 1 ease. 
greater than correspondi ng experimental observations . 
For the fuel handl i ng accident the staff assumed a fission product release 
fraction of 1. 5 x 10-s of the total noble gas and halogen inventories . On 
the basis of the GA analysis . this fraction ~s a conservati~e estima~e of the 
potential release following prolonged operat10n at 100 kW w1th a maX1mum local 
tempera t ure of " 112°C . Because the GA analysis assumes infinite operating time. 
it is assured that this approach gives a conservatively high release value. 
Because the noble gases do not condense or combine chemically. it is assumed. 
that any noble gases re l eased from t~e ~ladding will .diffuse i~ air until the1r 
rad i oactive decay . Conversely the 10d1nes are chem1cally act1ve but are not 
volatile at t emperatures below· ... 180°C . Some of these radionuclides wi ll be 
trapped by materials with wh ich they come i n .contact • . such a~ water and struc-
tures . Ev i dence i ndi cates that mos t of the 1 od i nes e1 ther w1ll not become or 
will not remain a i rborne under many acc i dent scenarios that are applicable to 
nonpower reactors (NUREG/C R-2079 ' NUREG-0771 ; Regulatory Guide (RG) 3. 34) . 
H ever to be certa i n that the fuel cladd i ng failure scenario leads to upper-
limi t d~se estimates for all poss i ble events. the staf f assumed that 100X of 
the iodines in the gap became airborne . This assumption will lead to computed 
thyroid doses that may be unrealistically high i n many scenarios; for example. 
those i n wh ich the cl add ing fa ilure occurs under water. 
14.1. 1 Scenar io 
The 1 icensee and the staff analyzed simi l ar scenarios that assumed that . th~ . 
cl add ing failure occurred i n air and calcu ~ ated subsequent doses ~o an 1nd1v1d-
ual in the reactor room and in the unrestr1cted area . The analys1s assumed 
that a cladding failure occurred i n a B-r i ng fuel element following an extended 
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run at the authorized maximum power (100 kW) so that all f i ssion products had 
reached their saturated activity levels. This is a conservative assumpt i on 
considering the typical operating his tory at the UUTR. Normally. a significant 
amount of time elapses between reactor shutdown and when any fuel is removed 
from the reactor; however. it was assumed that all fi ss ion-product radi onuc 1 ides 
were still at saturated activity levels at the time of release from the cladding . 
All the noble gases and halogens in the fuel cladding gap are assumed to be 
released i nstantaneously from the fuel element and are distributed uniformly in 
the reactor room. Scenarios incorporating more realistic estimates of the above 
conservat i ve assumpt ions wou 1 d reduce the computed doses s i gni fi cant ly . However . 
us i ng this scenario as a basis. the whole-body immersion dose (gamma-ray) and 
the potential thyroid dose from iodine inhalation were calculated for an indivi-
dual in the reactor room (occupational) and in an unrestricted area immediately 
outside the reactor building (public) . 
For the occupational exposure. it was assumed that the ventilation system was 
shut down at the time of the accident and all the airborne radioactivity was 
confi ned in the reactor room volume of 570 m3. It a 1 so was assumed that the 
core contained 70 elements (minimum critical loading) and that the failed element 
(B ring element) devel oped a power level 1. 6 times as high as the average element. 
Because there is no credible way that the postulated MHA could occur without 
operating personnel be ing alerted immediately. orderly evacuation of the reactor 
room would be accomplished within minutes ( ... 10 min) . For the outside exposure. 
it was assumed that the currently installed ventilation system was operating at 
its rated capaci ty of B.5 x lOs cm3 I s and tha t the emergency HEPA fi Iter system 
was not operating . The whole-body dose calculations assumed immers io n in a 
semi -infinite clo' .J in the unrestricted area (an unrealistically conservati ve 
assumption) (RG 3.34; NUREG-0851. NUREG/CR-2079. NUREG-0882) and in the more 
real istic finite room volume NUREG-0882 . 
14 . 1.2 Assessment 
The doses calculated by the s taff for the above assumptions and locations are 
presented in Table 14 .1. As a result of the underlying calculative and atmo-
spheric ass umpt ions (dispersion x/Q = 10- 2s/m3. all of the calculated occupa-
t i onal and publ ic doses shown in Table 14 . 1 are higher than could occur 
rea 1 is t i ca lly . As noted above. the dose ca I cu I at ions performed by the 1 i censee 
i n the SAR and by the sta ff were very similar. with small differences in t he 
assumptions. The doses in Table 14 . 1 are consistent with those calculated by 
the 1 i censee . 
Table 14 . 1 Ooses resulting from postulated fuel handling accident 
Thyroi d 
Exposure and Location Whole- body Immersi on Oo se Commi tted Oo se 
10- min (occupational) 0. 7 mrem (0 . 7 x 10- 2 mSv) 0 . 3 rem (3 mSv) 
exposure i n reactor room 
I-h (public) exposure 0.04 mrem (4 . 0 x 10- 4 mSv) 2.9 mrem 
immed iately outside the (2 . 9 x 10- 2 mSv) 
reactor bu il ding (semi-cloud) 
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On the basi s of the above di scussions and analys is , the s taf f concludes that if 
the maxima lly irrad iated fuel rod from the UUTR were to release all of its noble 
gaseous and ha 1 ogen fi ss i on products accumu 1 ated in the fue I c I add i ng gap, rad i-
at ion doses to both octupational personnel and to the publ i c i n unrestri c ted 
areas would be below the guideline values forming the bases of 10 CFR 20, Appen-
di x B. Accordi ng ly, the s ta ff conc 1 udes that there is reasonab 1 e assurance 
that the pos tu l a ted accident poses no significant radiological r i sk to the 
hea l th and safety of the public or to the operationa l staff . 
14 . 2 Rapid Insertion of Reactivity (Nuc l ear Excurs i on) 
The U-ZrH fue l in the UUTR exhibits a strong, prompt, negative temperature 
coeffici e~t of reactivity , as di scussed in Section 4.5. This temperature 
coeff i c i ent acts to terminate a pulse or nuclear excurs i on by decreasing the 
reacti vi ty as the temperature of the fuel increases . These results have been 
ver i fied at many operating TRIGA reactors . Although it may be poss i ble theo-
reticall y to rapidly insert suff i c i ent excess reactivity to create an excursion 
whe re fue l damage would occur before the excurs ion could be terminated , t he 
reac tivity li mits imposed by the Technical Specifications of the UUTR are 
i ntended to prec l ude such an event . 
14 . 2 . 1 Scenar i o 
The maxi mum power excursion that i s postulated is the event in which the total 
ava il ab le amount of excess reactivity i s inserted in to the core i nstantaneously . 
However , the s taff review of the UUTR has not been ab l e to i dentify a credible 
method for i ns tantaneously inserting all of the av a i lab le excess reactivity . 
The UUTR is li mited by the Technical Spec ifi cat io ns to 1.96% ~k/k (2 . BOS) excess 
react ivity above a cold, cl ean, cri t i cal condit ion . 
he s taff has consinered the scenario of the r eac tor ope r ating at some power 
level between 0 and 100 kW, at which time all the remaining excess react iv ity 
no compensated by the temperature coe fficient is inse rted rapid ly in to the 
core . The analysis neglected the reactivity l oss as a result of 135 Xe buildup . 
The staff determ i ned that the worst case wou l d be the i nitiation of a maximum 
s ep insert ion with the core at ambient temperature and essent i ally zero initi al 
powe r . he licensee has reac hed a si mil ar conclusi on . The poten t i al reactivity 
inser ion acci dent consequEnces that were considered by the s t a ff are melti ng 
of he fuel or c l add ing material, fai l ure of the cl add ing as a resul t of high 
i n erna l gas pressures, and phase changes in the fuel ma t r i x. If it were to 
occur. the major cause of fuel element cl add i ng fa ilu re at elevated temperatures 
in he a l uminum- and sta inl ess-steel-c l ad elements would res ult f rom exces sive 
s ress bu i Idup i n he cl add ing , caused by the hydrogen pres su re from the disso-
ci a ion of he ZrHx (S imnad et al. . 1976; GA-4314, 19BO). 
Ca I c I a t i ons per formed by Genera I A tomi c and canf i rmed by exper iments i nd i cate 
that no fuel damage occurs at trans i ent peak fuel emperatures as high as 
... 530oC for low-hydr ide type (U-ZrH1.0) alum inum- cl ad elements (GA-4314, 19BO) , 
and 117SoC for high-hydr i de-type (U-ZrH 1. 7) stainless-steel - clad-fue l el ements 
(GA-6874 . 1966; Si mnad et a l.. 1976 ; GA-4314. 1980) . Beyond these respective 
~ pera ures. substan t ia I va I ume changes assoc i ated wi th the phase t r ans forma-
tions migh occur i n the low- hydride f ue l and in terna l gas pressure i n t he high-
hyd - ide f ue l cou l d stress the s ta inl ess-s teel cladd i ng e.ces si ve ly (GA-7882 , 
1967) . 
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Th~ ~ost 1 im~ting scenari o at the UUTR is based on a core configuration con-
taInIng alumInum-clad elements loaded in the innermost (B) ring . If any 
excess reactivity were inserted, the maximum fuel temperature reached would be 
in the B-ring core pOSition. 
The staff has reviewed the literature for large reactivity insertions into cores 
wit~ aluminum-clad low-hydride elements and has found that GA has performed ex-
peflments WIth 3.00$ step reactivity insertions in a TRIGA reactor core containing 
~90 fuel elements. This amount of reactivity insertion yielded a reactor period 
of 4 ms, a peak power of ~700 MW, a total energy of 14 MWs, and a measured peak 
fuel temperature of 475°C. 
The fuel temperature in the hottest core position was measured and the fuel 
elements were . ex~min~d after each step reactivity insertion (GA-1966, 1961). 
There was no Indlc~tlo~ of fuel or cladding melt or other distortion that might 
resul t from excessIVe I nterna 1 gas pressure, and the maximum temperature never 
reached the phase trans i t i on va 1 ue (~550°C) for the a 1 umi num-c 1 ad 1 ow- hydri de 
fuel elements (GA-4314, 19~0) . 
14 . 2. 2 Assessment 
Because of the design specifications of standard low-enrichment U-ZrH fuel, 
the ~ower and temperature characteristics are essentially independentXof the 
hydflde content. However, the low-hydride matrix exhibits the transition at 
~550oC, whereas the hi gh-hydri de matri x undergoes no phase trans it i on in the 
temperature range of reactor tests (~12000C). Therefore , in a mixed core, so 
long as low-hydrid~ fuel in the B ring is op~rated in a tempe ra ture range of 
no damage, there WIll be an even larger margIn of safety against damage i n 
high-hydride fuel. 
Thus, because the low-hydride fuel showed no damage effects after many 3-doll ar 
pulse~, . the:e is :easonable assurance that a single 1. 96% ~k/k (2 . 80S) step 
reactIvIty InsertIon aCCIdent In a nonpulsing reactor such as the UUTR will no t 
result in a loss of cladding integrity or mechanical damage to the f ue l. 
9n the . bas ~ s of these considerations, the staff concludes that the rapid 
InsertIon Into the UUTR core of the 1. 96% ~k/k (2 . 80$) available excess 
reactivity will not result i n fuel melting nor a cladding failure as a result 
of high temperature or high internal gas pressure . Therefore, there is reaso n-
able assurance tha t the fission products contained i n the fuel will not be 
released to the envi r onment as a result of the rap i d insertion of reactivity 
acci dent . 
14 . 3 Loss-of-Coolant Accident 
The rapid loss of shi eld ing and cool ing water immediately following reactor 
operation is a potential accident that would result in the i ncrease of fuel and 
cladding temperatures. Beca use the water is required for sufficien t moderation 
of the neutrons , the los s of coolant in the reac to r wou ld terminate any signif-
icant neutron chain r eact ion and thus terminate the fission power production . 
However , the residual radioactivity resulting from fissio n product decay wou ld 
continue to depos it heat ene rgy in the fuel , and would co nstitute an unshielded 
radiation source in the bottom of the tank . 
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Even though the licensee considers the a~cidental loss .of coolant.to be an . 
event of very low probability, an analys ls of hypothet l cal scenarlos .l n Wh l Ch 
the water dra ins frolll the tank was performed . Because the coolant plpes to the 
c i rculation systelll contain syphon-break vents and neither pipe extends below 
the top of the fuel, malfunction of this system ca~not lead to i nadvertent loss 
of core cooling. It is poss i ble that a catastrophlc earthquake could cause 
sufficient damage to the reactor tank system to cause water loss, but because 
of the double tank and l ocation below ground level, the 1 icensee considers the 
scenario to be very unlikely to occur . The staff agrees with th is position . 
14 .3 . 1 Scenario 
The licensee analyzed two tank-failure scenarios: (1~ instantaneous tot~l 
loss of coolant and (2) slow drainage of the coolant lnto the amblent sO lI. 
For scenario (1), the 1 icensee assumed that the reactor had operated at fu l l 
li censed power (100 kW) for a long time, and then the tank lost all water 
i ns tantaneous ly . The loss of moderator termi nated the neutr?n cha i n react i on 
but f i ssion product decay continued to heat the fuel. The l1censee assumed 
that only natural thermal convect i on of air up through the core would r emove 
th i s decay heat . 
The 1 icensee also calculated the hypothetical expos ure rate above the tank 
produced by the unsh ielded core . The maximum calculated fuel temperature ':las 
approxilllately 61°e, reached in about an hour . For fuel temperatures l n th lS 
range, the changes i n pressure i nside the fue l cladd i ng are caused by thermal 
expans ion of any conf i ned a ir and are small compared to the pressures at the 
temperatures discussed in Section 14 . 2. 
The initi a l r ad i at ion l eve ls at the top of the tank would be much too high for 
personne l safety , but potent i al uposure in unrestricted areas would be li mi ted 
by the colli mating effect of the earth around the ta nk . 
For scenari 0 (2), the 1 i censee assumed a 1 arge breach ! n the ta nk, but the r ate 
of loss of water was controlled by seepage into the SOlI. On the basls of the 
characteristics of the an:b ient soil, i t wa s estimated that i t wou ld requ ire 
a lDlOs t 20 hours for the water l evel to fall t o the bottom of the fue l. The 
s e conservative ass pt ion as in scenar io (1) wa s made that the reactor h~d 
opera ted at 100 kw for a very long t ime, but i t wa s also assumed for scenarlO 
(2) hat the reactor was scrammed at the t ime of onset of wate r loss. 
Bec use the core wa s submerged for hours after shu tdown, the decay heat sou rce 
decreased by l arge factor, so the fuel temperature incr~lse would be much 
sIler even than for scenario (1) . Furthermore, the exposure rate at the top 
of he ank is not si gnif icant un t il the water level has falle n to about core 
I eve I, prov i ding 10 to 12 hours for protect i ve act i on by licensee personne 1. 
. 3. 2 Assessment 
e staff has rev iewed the licensee's an lysis, and concurs wi h the assumptions 
and thods . On the bas i s 0 f the above cons i dera t ions, the s ta f f conc I udes tha t 
loss of coolant at the UUTR, wh il e a very unl i ke ly event. would lead to no fuel 
ge or consequent releas" of rad ioact ivity to the environment or undue 
rad ia ion uposur" of the pub l ic. 
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14 . 4 Misplaced Experiments 
The potential misplacement of experimental samples or devices in an experimental 
facility might result in an irradiation condition that could exceed the design 
specifications . In this situation, the sample could becOll1e overheated or develop 
pressures that could cause a failure of the experiment container . As discussed 
in Section 10, all experiments at UUTR are reviewed before insertion, ~nd all 
experiments in the region of the core are isolated from the fuel claddlng by at 
least two barriers such as the central thimble and an internal tube . Further-
more, fueled experiments, with their relatively large fissile heat source, are 
not permitted by the Technical Specifications . 
On the basis of the above considerations, the staff concludes that the experi-
mental facilities and the procedures for experimental review at the UUTR are 
adequate to provide reasonable assurance that failure of experiments is not 
likely, and even if such a failure occurred, breaching of the reactor fuel 
cladding would not occur . In addition, if an experiment should fail and re-
lease radioactivity within an experimental irradiation facility, there is rea-
sonable assurance that the amount of radioactivity released to the environment 
would not be more than that from the accident (MIlA) discussed in Section 14 . l. 
14 . 5 Mechanical Rearrangement of the Fuel 
This type of potential accident might involve the failure of some reactor sys-
tem, such as the support structure, or it could involve an externally originated 
event that disperses the fuel and, in so doing, breaches the cladding of one or 
more fuel elements. 
During the removal of irradiated fuel from the UUTR, an ~1000-lb (455- kg) s teel-
encased fuel handling cask is lowered into the pool by a crane . An ir rad iated 
fuel element is loaded into the cask, and the cask is removed from the pool . 
The staff has considered the possibility of this cask being dropped into the 
pool dur i ng the handling process, resulting in some type of fuel cladd i ng damage 
and escape of fission products . Because of the dissolution of the halogens in 
the pool water, the staff concludes that the quantity of fiss i on products re-
leased to the room a i r as a result of this accident would be lower than those 
released from the fuel handl i ng accident (MIlA) evaluated in Section 14 . 1. Even 
if several fuel elements should be damaged, the potent ial releases to the en-
vironment would stil l fa ll wi th i n 10 eFR 20 guidelines . Therefore, the s ta ff 
concludes that there is reasonable assurance that no credible inadve r tent 
mechanical rear rangement of fuel would result in an acc i dent with more severe 
consequences to the publ ic than the MIlA . 
14 . 6 Effects of Fuel Aging 
The s taff has i ncluded a discussion on the phenomena of fuel ag i ng i n th is sec-
tion for the purpose of addressing al l credible effects that might con tr ibu te 
to the release of a i rborne radioact i vity to unrestr i cted areas . However , fuel 
ag i ng should be considered normal with r eactor operat i on an~ is, in ~act, ex-. 
pected to occur gradua lly . Reactions external to the cl addlng are dlscussed ln 
Secti on 17 ; the possibility of interna l reactions i s discussed be low. 
There is evide~ce that the U-ZrHx fue l tends to fragment wi th use, probably be-
cause of the s tresses caused by high tempe rature grad i ents and the high heating 
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rates dur i ng pulsing operations (GA-9064, 1970; Simnad, 1976; GA-4314, 1980) . 
Poss i ble consequences of fragmentation include (1) a decrease in thermal con-
ductivity across cracks leading to higher central fuel temperatures during 
operation and (2) an i ncrease in the amount of fission product release into the 
cracks i n the fuel . However, because the UUTR is not pulsed, the fuel ag i ng 
effects i n the U-ZrH matrix associated with the thermal stresses resu l ting 
fr~" puls i ng are exp~cted not to occur during operation of the UUTR. 
8ecause no known deterioration of the matrix occurs at the low operating tempera-
tures at 100 kW, the likely effects of aging of the U-ZrH fuel moderator in 
puls i ng and/or higher powered reactors will not have a si~nificant effect on 
the operating temperature of the fuel or on the release of gaseous fission pro-
ducts in the UUTR. Therefore, the staff concludes that there is reasonable 
assurance that fuel aging will not sigr.ificantly change the safety margins asso-
c iated with continued use of the UUTR fuel . 
14 .7 Conclusion 
The staff has reviewed the credible accidents for the UUTR . On the basis of 
th i s revi ew , the postulated accident with the greatest potential effect on the 
envi ronment i s the loss of cladding integrity of an irradiated fuel element in 
a ir i n the reactor room. The analysis of th i s accident indicated that even 
if the cl add i ng of several fuel rods failed simultaneously , the potential dose 
equ iva lents i n unrestricted areas still would be below the guidelines values of 
10 CFR 20. Therefore, the staff concludes that the design of the facility and 
t he Technica l Specifications provide reasonable assurance that the UUTR can be 
opera ted wi th a low probability of accidents and that even the max imum hypothet-
ica l acci dent will pose no significant risk to the health and safety of the 
publ ic. 
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15 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 
The . licensee~s Technical Specifica~io~s, evaluated in this licensing action, 
d~flne certal~ features, charact~r~stlcs, and conditions governing the con-
tlnued operatlon of the UUTR faclllty . These TeChnical Specifications will be 
explicitly included in the renewal license as Appendix A. Formats and contents 
acce~table.to the NRC have been used in the development of these Technical 
Speclflcatlons, and the staff has reviewed them using the ANSI/ANS 15. 1-1982 
standard as a gui de . 
On the basis of its review, the staff concludes that normal reactor operation 
within the limits of the Technical Specifications will not result in offsite 
radiation exposures in excess of 10 CFR 20 guidelines . Furthermore the 
limiting conditions for operation, surveillance requirements, and e~gineered 
safety features will limit the likelihood of malfunctions and mitigate the 
consequences to the public of off-normal or accident events . 
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16 FINANCIAL QUALIFICATIONS 
The UUTR is owned and operated by a state educat ional i nst itut i on i n support 
of its role i n educat i on and research. On the basis of f i nancial i nformation 
suppl i ed by the l i censee in its subMittal of March 8, 1983 , as supplemented , 
the staff concludes that funds will be made available ;, as necessary , to support 
continued operations and eventually to shut down the t~cil i ty and ma i ntain i t 
i n a conditi on that would constitute no risk to the public . The l i censee's 
financial status was reviewed and found to be acceptable i n accordance with 
the requ i retllents of 10 CFR 50 . 33(f) . 
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17 OTHER LICENSE CONS IOERATIONS 
17 . 1 Prior Reactor Ut i l i zation 
Prev i ous sections of th i s SER concluded that normal operat i on of the reactor 
causes insign i ficant risk of radiation exposure to the public, and that only 
an off-no rmal or accident event could cause some measurable exposure . Even a 
maximum hypothet i cal accident would not lead to a dose to the most exposed 
individual greater than applicable guideline values of 10 CFR 20 . 
The staff concluded that the reactor was initially designed and constructed to 
operate safely . During the rev i ew for license renewal, the staff considered 
whether prior operation would cause significant degradation in the capability 
of components and systems to continue to perform the i r safety funct i on . Because 
fuel cladding is the component most responsible for preventing release of fission 
products to the environment , possib l e mechani sms that could lead to detr imental 
changes in i ntegrity we re considered . Prominent among the considerations were 
the following : (1) rad iat ion degradat i on of cladding integrity , (2) high fue l 
temperatu re or temperature cycling leading to changes in the mechanical proper-
t i es of the claddi ng , (3) corrosion or eros i on of the cladding leading to thinn i ng 
or other weakening, (4) mechan i cal damage resulting from handling or experimental 
use , and (5) degradat ion of safety components or systems . 
The staff ' s conclus i ons regard i ng these parameters , in the order i n wh i ch they 
we re i dent ifi ed above , follow . 
(1) Nea r ly ident i cal fue l has been laboratory tested elsewhere, and has been 
exposed i n si mila r irradiat i on cond i t i ons to much hi ghe r total radiat i on 
doses i n operat i ng reactors , such as at the General Atomi c Company and the 
Un iversi ty of I l l i noi s . No s i gn i ficant degradation of cladding has 
resulted i n any of t hese reactors . 
(2) The powe r de nsity , cool ant fl ow rat es , and maxi mum temperat ures reached 
i n t he UUTR fue l are fa r be low si mi lar parameters in some other nonpowe r 
reactors us i ng s i mil ar fue 1. No damage has occurred dur i ng norma I opera-
tions i n any of these reactors. 
(3) The coolant flow rate at the UUTR is much lower than used at severa l 
higher powered research reac t ors using UZrH TRIGA-type fue l. No erosion 
problems have been observed . At the UUT R f§ci l ity, corrosi on is kept to 
a reasonable minimum by careful control of the conduc t ivity of the primary 
coolant/moderator water . 
(4) The fuel is handled as i nfrequently as possible, consistent with required 
surveillance. Any indications of possib le damage or degrada tion are 
invest i gated immediately, and damaged fuel would be removed from service 
in acco rda nce with Technical Specifications . All experiments placed near 
the core are isolated from the fuel cladding by a water gap and at least 
one barrier or encapsulation . 
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(5) The UUTR personnel perform regular preventive and corrective maintenance 
and replace components, as necessary . Nevertheless, there have been some 
INlfunctions of equipment . However , the staff review indicates that most 
of these .alfunctions have been random one-of-a-kind incidents, typical 
of even good qual i ty electromechanical instrumentation. There is no 
indication of significant degradation of the instrUllK!ntation , and the 
staff further has determined that the preventive maintenance program 
would lead to adequate identification and replacetlM!nt before significant 
degradation occurred. Therefore, the staff concludes that there has been 
no apparent significant degradation of safety equipment and, because 
there is strong evidence that any future degradation will lead to prOllPt 
relledial action by the licensee, there is reasonable assurance that there 
will be no significant increase in the likelihood of occurrence of a 
reactor accident as a result of component .alfunction. 
17. 2 Conclusion 
In additi on to the considerations above, the staff has reviewed annual reports 
and event reports fro. the licensee and inspection reports and informal co.ents 
fro. the regional office . On the basis of this review, the staff concludes 
that there has been no significant degradation of equiptllent and that facll ity 
INnagewnt will continue to maintain and operate the reactor so that there is 
no significant increase in the radiological risk to the employees or the public . 
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18 CONCLUSIONS 
B~sed on its evaluation of the application as set forth in the . 
tlons, the st~ff has determined that prevlous sec-
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
The appli 7ation for renewal of Operating License R-126 for its h 
reactor flled .by t~e University of Utah, dated March 8, 1983 a~e~~ar~e_ 
mented, complles wlth the requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of ~~54 
~~ ~~:n~~~p~!~eI~ct), and the Commission's regulations set forth in ' 
The facility will operate in conformity wl· th the 1· m t d th . app lcation as supple-
en e, e provlsions of the Act, and the rules d 1 Commission. an regu ations of the 
There !s re~sonable assurance (a) that the activ i ties authorized b th 
operatlng llcense 7an be conducted without endangering the health ~nd e 
safet~ of th~ publlC; and (b) that such activities will be conducted in 
C
compllance wlth the regulations of the Commission set forth in 10 CFR 
hapter I. 
Th~ . l!~~nsee is t~chnically and financially qualified to engage in the 
ac lVl les authorlzed by the license in accordance with the regulations 
of the Commi ss i on set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I. 
The renew~l of this license will not be inimical to the common defense 
and securlty or to the health and safety of the public . 
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